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INTERNATIONAL SHOE GETS THE BOOT: BURNHAM V.
SUPERIOR COURT RESURRECTS THE
PHYSICAL POWER THEORY
I. INTRODUCTION
A court's assertion of jurisdiction must not deprive a defendant of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.1 This idea has domi-
nated the area of personal jurisdiction since the United States Supreme
Court decided Pennoyer v. Neff.2 What constitutes due process of law,
however, is far less settled. The recent personal jurisdiction case of Burn-
ham v. Superior Court3 weaves a new strand in the evolving fabric of due
process jurisprudence. The Burnham decision reverses the thirteen-year
trend away from presence-based jurisdiction4 by unanimously affirming a
state's assertion of jurisdiction based solely on service of process on the
defendant within that state's borders.'
The evolution of the law in the area of personal jurisdiction has,
over many years, seen various theories develop and be discarded.6 Asser-
tions of personal jurisdiction have generally been based on either a physi-
cal power7 or fairness theory' and categorized as in personam, quasi in
rem or in rem.9 The physical power theory of in personam jurisdiction
has much historical appeal, but United States Supreme Court cases, such
1. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1877); U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1.
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
4. Presence-based jurisdiction refers to the obtaining of personal jurisdiction over a party
due to mere physical presence of that individual in the forum at the time process is served. See
infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
5. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115; id. at 2120 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2126 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
6. See infra notes 27-123 and accompanying text.
7. The "physical power" theory is based upon actual control over something or someone
physically present within the territorial boundaries of the state. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720;
Johnston, The Fallacy of Physical Power, 1 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 37, 47 (1967).
8. The "fairness theory" is based upon the concept that, in order to comport with due
process, procedures must not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
9. The term in personam jurisdiction refers to a court's power over a defendant's person,
in contrast to a court's power over the defendant's interest in property (quasi in rem), or power
over the property itself (in rem). BLAcK's LAW DiciONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
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as International Shoe Co. v. Washington "o and Shaffer v. Heitner,1" have
explicitly abolished aspects of that theory, supplanting it in certain areas
with a fairness analysis. 2
The Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer 13 was heralded by some as
signalling the end of the physical power theory in its purest form; that of
transient jurisdiction. 4 Other commentators, however, believed that the
impact of Shaffer would be minimal.'" Still others cautiously declined to
predict the exact direction or scope of the Shaffer decision. 6 Lower
courts were split on the issue as well."
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (asserted jurisdiction over corporate defendant based on its con-
tacts with forum state).
11. 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (invalidated assertion of jurisdiction based solely on quasi in rem
attachment of defendant's property in forum state).
12. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. See infra notes 60-
123 and accompanying text.
13. Shaffer was not an in personam case, but its due process analysis could easily be ap-
plied to in personam cases due to the Court's broad language stating that "all assertions of
state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe Co. and its progeny." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
14. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam
Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REv. 38, 61 (1979); Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v.
Heitner and the Demise of Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565, 567,
589 (1979).
The term "transient" jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction based solely on the defendant's
fleeting presence in a state where he or she is served with process for litigation unrelated to his
or her activities in the forum. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 289 (1956). This form of jurisdic-
tion has also been referred to as the "tagged," "gotcha," or "catch as catch can" theory of
jurisdiction. Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the
Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 729 (1981); Werner, supra, at 589.
15. Smit, The Importance of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal, 45 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 519, 531 (1979); Note, Jurisdiction-A Methodological Analysis: Implications for Pres-
ence and Domicile as Jurisdictional Bases-Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), 53 WASH.
L. REv. 537, 546-47 (1978); see also Glen, An Analysis of "Mere Presence" and Other Tradi-
tionalBases of Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 607, 611 (1979) (contending transient juris-
diction appropriate if individual entered forum purposefully).
16. Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Fed-
eral Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 18-19 (1982); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: New Constitutional Ques-
tions Concerning Seider v. Roth, 6 HorsTRA L. REv. 393, 410 (1978); Comment, The
Reasonableness Standard In State-Court Jurisdiction: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Uniform Min-
imum Contacts Theory, 14 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 51, 53 n.18 (1978).
17. See, eg., Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1388-89 (5th Cir. 1987) (upheld juris-
diction based solely upon service within forum); Amusement Equip. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264,
270 (5th Cir. 1985) (reaffirmed exercise of transient jurisdiction after Shaffer); Nehemiah v.
Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 47-48 (3d Cir. 1985) (service of unincorporated
association's agent within forum insufficient basis for jurisdiction; minimum contacts re-
quired); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, 626 F. Supp. 305, 310-13 (N.D. 111.
1986) (interpreted Shaffer as destroying transient jurisdiction rule and requiring minimum
contacts analysis for all in personam actions); Cariaga v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 762 P.2d
886, 887-88 (Nev. 1988) (minimum contacts analysis not needed when defendant personally
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From this debate evolved a great need for a resolution of the issue
presented by a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident based
solely on service of process within the territorial boundaries of the
state."8 Would International Shoe and its progeny apply to this situation
in the wake of Shaffer? While the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Burnham appears to resolve this issue, in reality, it further con-
fuses the area of personal jurisdiction.
In Burnham, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to de-
termine the validity of California's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident father visiting his children in California while on a business
trip.19 In affirming California's exercise of jurisdiction over the father, a
plurality of the Court resurrected the physical power theory and, at the
same time, validated transient jurisdiction.20 The Court, however, could
not agree upon the appropriate due process analysis.21
The Burnham Court's failure to establish a definitive interpretation
of Shaffer leaves lower courts with little guidance as to what type of due
process analysis should apply to in personam actions. At its broadest,
this decision has the potential to impact the existing minimum contacts
analysis.12 In light of its focus on presence-based jurisdiction, however, it
is more likely to only affect other single-factor bases23 of jurisdiction,
served within forum); Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700 P.2d 347, 349
(1985) (service during defendant's transient presence in forum held insufficient basis for juris-
diction); Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693, 695-96 (Wyo. 1988) (transient jurisdiction held
to survive Shaffer and comport with due process).
18. See, ag., Bernstine, supra note 14, at 54; Comment, supra note 16, at 79.
19. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
20. See id. at 2107. Justices Kennedy and White and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Jus-
tice Scalia's plurality opinion concluding that due process did not prohibit the exercise of
jurisdiction based on in-state service of process. Id. at 2119. Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and O'Connor joined Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, reasoning that transient jurisdic-
tion is valid, as long as the individual is voluntarily and knowingly in the state when served.
Id. at 2120, 2126 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred separately. Id. at 2126
(Stevens, J., concurring).,
21. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia, set forth a traditional due process
analysis. See id. at 2115-17. Justices Brennan and White, however, each set out a different due
process analysis. See id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2120-22 (Brennan, J., con-
curring). Additionally, Justice Stevens concurred without explaining how the requirements of
due process were met. See id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. See infra notes 367-90 and accompanying text.
23. A single-factor basis of jurisdiction is based on the concept that the existence of a
single factor automatically confers jurisdiction. See Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of Jurisdic-
tion-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 276-77.
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such as domicile24 and consent.25
This Note examines the history of the physical power and the tran-
sient jurisdiction rules, and discusses the distinctions between these two
rules. This Note also discusses the various due process models employed
by the Burnham Court in its analysis of the physical power theory of
jurisdiction. Finally, this Note explores the implications of the Burnham
decision and suggests an alternative approach to the Court's analyses.
II. HIsToRicAL FRAMEWORK
A thorough understanding of the background of the physical power
rule is crucial to an appreciation of Burnham v. Superior Court 26 because
of the disagreement among members of the Court over the use of history
and tradition in the due process analysis. Also necessary is an under-
standing of the evolution of due process, which was pushed to new limits
in Burnham.
A. The Physical Power Theory
In the nineteenth century, a young United States of America could
not look to any one country's laws for guidance in the evolving area of
personal jurisdiction.27 The United States had a distinctive jurisdictional
24. Domicile is "that place where a man has his true, fixed and permanent home and
principle establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning."
BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 435 (5th ed. 1979).
25. Consent is "[a] concurrence of wills. Voluntarily yielding the will to the proposition of
another; acquiescence or compliance therewith." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 276 (5th ed.
1979).
26. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
27. Civil law countries traditionally emphasized the defendant's domicile as the primary
basis for jurisdiction both at the international level and within a single country. See Smit,
Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An Analysis of Underly-
ing Policies, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 335, 335-36 (1972); Comment, Developments in the Law-
State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 913 (1960).
Conversely, "in common law countries, the technical development of the writ system
stressed the service of the capias ad respondendum as the crucial event." Smit, supra, at 341.
Capias ad respondendum, a judicial writ, was the medieval equivalent of a summons to appear
in court; it commanded the sheriff to take the defendant and keep him safely so he may appear
before the court on a certain day. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (5th ed. 1979). Originally
all English actions were "local" in the sense that they had to be held wherever the operative
facts underlying the litigation occurred. Werner, supra note 14, at 568-70. "[A] purely territo-
rial notion of jurisdiction grew up in medieval England where a strong central court exercised
judicial power over a fairly vast, self-sufficient territory .... ." Schlesinger, Methods of Progress
in Conflict of Laws Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of "Transient" Jurisdiction, 9
J. PUB. L. 313, 317 (1960).
The advent of the "transitory" cause of action and the evolution of service of process led
to the rule of presence-oriented jurisdiction. Werner, supra note 14, at 568-70. Even the de-
fendant's presence, however, was not a settled basis for jurisdiction in England in the nine-
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problem because, "while the country [was] socially and economically es-
sentially a unitary state, legally and politically it [was] in many respects a
federation of distinct polities."2 Additionally, United States citizens al-
ways have had a legal right to move'from state to state and to project
themselves commercially into all parts of the nation.29 This creates a
dichotomy in that our national unity is conducive to nationally applied
laws, while our political plurality requires a choice of law and jurisdic-
tional rules among the several states.3 0
The Supreme Court faced this dichotomy when it decided the
landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff.3  Prior to Pennoyer, some states had
already adopted the concept of presence-oriented jurisdiction.32 The rule
of law in the states, however, was unsettled, and precedent was scarce.33
Thus, in Pennoyer, the Court supplemented its use of United States pre-
cedent with c6ntinental sources as related by Justice Joseph Story,34
thereby creating what has come to be known as the physical power
theory.
35
Pennoyer dominated the jurisprudence of jurisdiction from the mo-
ment of its rendition 6.3  The "two well established principles of public
law' 37 which Justice Field used as the basis of the Pennoyer decision
were: (1) "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory;" and (2) "no State can
teenth century. Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 297-98; Hazard, A General Theory of State-
Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 241, 255. "The defendant's presence in England seems
to have been less a reason for asserting jurisdiction than an obviation of a reason why it should
not be asserted; it could hardly be said that personal presence was the basis for jurisdiction."
Id.
28. Hazard, supra note 27, at 246.
29. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
35, 49 (1867). The privileges and immunities clause implies this right by stating that "[tihe
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
30. Hazard, supra note 27, at 247.
31. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
32. See, e.g., Murphy v. John S. Winter & Co., 18 Ga. 690, 690-92 (1855); Weil v. Lowen-
thai, 10 Iowa 575, 578 (1860); Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217, 220 (1870).
33. See Hazard, supra note 27, at 253 -58, for a discussion of British precedent in this area.
34. See J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 543, 554 (1846).
35. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722; see Hazard, supra note 27, at 258-61. Professor Hazard
notes that Justice Story greatly influenced Pennoyer. Hazard, supra note 27, at 262. Accord-
ing to Hazard, Justice Story elaborated on propositions of the Dutch jurist Huber which in
turn became the basis of Justice Field's opinion in Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. Hazard, supra
note 27, at 259-62. Cases prior to Pennoyer also cited Justice Story. See Murphy, 18 Ga. at
691-92; Weil, 10 Iowa at 578; Peabody, 106 Mass. at 220.
36. Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rule" A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43
BROOKLYN L. REv. 600, 602 (1977).
37. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
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exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property with-
out its territory."3 These concepts cemented the physical power doc-
trine in this country.39 Without physical presence, a state was powerless
over a civil defendant."
Pennoyer gave United States courts the first definitive statement of
what constitutd due process in the area of judicial proceedings.41 The
Court stated that proceedings in a court lacking jurisdiction over the par-
ties did not constitute due process of law.42 The Pennoyer Court defined
due process as "a course of legal proceedings according to those rules
and principles which have been established in our systems of jurispru-
dence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. '4 3 The Court
thus applied the due process clause as a limitation on the jurisdiction of
state courts to enter judgments affecting the rights or interests of non-
resident defendants.'
B. The Expansion of Physical Power and the Rise of Fairness
Courts and commentators recognized the force and vitality of the
physical power theory;45 however, some criticized its dangers and short-
comings as well.' The physical power theory was later recognized as
being extremely narrow in scope,47 and fell prey to exceptions4" based on
38. Id.
39. See Johnston, supra note 7, at 46-47; Smit, supra note 36, at 601.
40. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722; Johnston, supra note 7, at 47.
41. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733-34.
42. Id. The right to due process is embodied in the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
43. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
44. Since Pennoyer, the due process clause has been used as an instrument of interstate
federalism that can act to divest a state of its power to render a valid judgment. Brilmayer,
How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV.
77, 85.
45. See, eg., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation of jurisdiction
is physical power"); Johnston, supra note 7, at 49; Comment, supra note 27, at 936.
46. See, eg., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Ehrenzweig,
supra note 14, at 289-90.
47. Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66
MICH. L. REv. 227, 227 (1967); Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 309; Hazard, supra note 27, at
272; Johnston, supra note 7, at 49; Werner, supra note 14, at 575; Comment, supra note 16, at
58.
48. See National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (consent to juris-
diction given by contractual agreement held valid); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64
(1940) (domicile in forum state sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction); Adam v. Saenger, 303
U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (party filing claim in forum court submits to forum court's jurisdiction);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (use of highways by non-resident motorist deemed
equivalent to appointment by him of agent in state to receive process related to any action
arising out of driving in forum); Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 254-
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legal fictions expanding the doctrine of physical power beyond its con-
strained "territorial" limitation.49 The Supreme Court created three
main exceptions to address the physical power theory limitations: (1)
actual consent given by agreement, 0 filing a claim"1 or designating an
agent;5 2 (2) implied consent, by having property in the forum, 3 being
domiciled in the forum5 4 or engaging in certain activities in the forum;55
and (3) corporate presence implied by engaging in business in the fo-
rum.5 6 Courts used these legal fictions to relax the rigid physical power
rules, thereby making them "more adaptable to the increased mobility of
population and business interests" which characterized the growing
United States in the twentieth century.57
The proliferation of these exceptions and their complexity, espe-
cially regarding jurisdiction over corporations,58 eventually led to the im-
plementation of a fairness theory. 9 The Supreme Court, in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,' ° rejected such legal fictions in favor of a more
flexible fairness and reasonableness approach.61 The Court no longer
considered presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court a prereq-
55 (1909) (state may require foreign corporation's agent to receive process when such agent is
transacting business in forum); Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1886) (presence of
property in state gives court jurisdiction over disposition of property); St. Clair v. Cox, 106
U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (state may condition transaction of business by foreign corporations
within its borders on acceptance of service by such corporation's designated agent).
49. See National Equip. Rental, 375 U.S. at 315-16; Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463-64; Adam,
303 U.S. at 67-68; Hess, 274 U.S. at 356; Commercial Mut. Accident Co., 213 U.S. at 245;
Freeman, 119 U.S. at 188; St. Clair, 106 U.S. at 356; Cowen, Transient Jurisdiction: A British
View, 9 J. PuB. LAw. 303, 310 (1960); Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 309-11; Johnston, supra
note 7, at 49-51; Werner, supra note 14, at 575; Note, supra note 16, at 395.
50. See National Equip. Rental, 375 U.S. at 315-16.
51. See Adam, 303 U.S. at 67-68.
52. See Commercial Mut. Accident Co., 213 U.S. at 254-55.
53. See Freeman, 119 U.S. at 188-89.
54. See Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463-64.
55. See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356.
56. See St. Clair, 106 U.S. at 356.
57. Johnston, supra note 7, at 49.
58. See Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213 (1921)
(service on appointed agent of foreign corporation held void where corporation had ceased
operations and withdrawn property before suit was filed); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc.,
45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (foreign corporation which visited forum sporadically to deal with
forum corporation in whose shares it owned controlling interest held not doing business within
state and therefore not subject to forum court's jurisdiction).
59. The fairness theory was first articulated by the Court in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940), but was pushed to the forefront of personal jurisdiction in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
60. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
61. Id. at 316-17.
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uisite to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.6 2 The Court held, in-
stead, that in order to subject an absent defendant to a judgment in
personam, due process requires only that the defendant "have certain
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "63
The Court recognized this formulation of due process as a needed
response to changing times.64 Yet the Court realized that, even in the
mobile society of the 1940s, such a rule must have limits. 65 The Court
articulated those limits by requiring a minimal nexus between the defend-
ant and the forum.66
International Shoe thus abolished one of the two basic holdings of
Pennoyer: that a state was prohibited from exercising direct jurisdiction
and authority over persons* or property outside its territory. 67 It did
nothing, however, to disturb the remaining Pennoyer rule that "every
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory."6
C. Testing the Limits of Fairness After International Shoe Co. v.
Washington
United States Supreme Court cases in the wake of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington 69 struggled to define the amorphous standard of
"fairness and substantial justice." 70 The cases focused on the "quality
and nature of the activity [in the forum] in relation to the fair and orderly
62. Id.
63. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
64. Id. The Court reasoned that "now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons" the due process analysis must change as well. Id.
65. Id. at 319.
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of laws .... (the due
process] clause does,not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations.
Id.
66. Id.
67. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
68. Id.
69. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
70. See eg., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Perkins v. Ben-
guet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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administration of the laws,"71 in their attempts to refine the doctrine.72
As a result, the analysis under the fairness theory evolved into a series of
questions concerning the defendant's relationship to the forum and con-
venience to the parties.73 According to the "minimum contacts analysis"
of International Shoe and its progeny, a plaintiff must satisfy two related
inquiries before a court can exercise jurisdiction.74 The first examines the
quality and nature of the defendant's contacts, 75 and the second exam-
ines the fairness and reasonableness of jurisdiction under the
circumstances.76
1. Quality and nature of contacts
Under International Shoe and its progeny, the significance of a de-
fendant's contacts both in quantity and in relatedness to the cause of
action determines whether the court can exercise "general jurisdiction"
77
or "specific jurisdiction."7" The fewer contacts an individual has with a
forum, the more intimately those contacts must be tied to the plaintiff's
claim to justify an assertion of personal jurisdiction.79
Under the Supreme Court's test, a court should scrutinize the qual-
ity and nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum state to deter-
mine whether it is reasonable and fair to require him or her to conduct
his or her defense in that state.80 The Supreme Court, in Hanson v.
Denckla,1 held that the assertion of jurisdiction is not justified by the
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with the defend-
ant. 2 Thus, the Court qualified the types of contacts necessary to meet
the fairness analysis, stating that "it is essential in each case that there be
71. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
72. See, e-g., Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253-54.
73. See Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 113; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
74. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77.
75. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
76. Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 113; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77.
77. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9. "When a state exercises
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's
contacts with the forum, the state is exercising general jurisdiction .... ." Id.
78. Id. at 414 n.8. When a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
arising out of that defendant's contacts with the forum, the state is exercising "specific jurisdic-
tion." Id.
79. See McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). "[J]urisdiction,
grounded upon a single act, must be limited to causes of action arising out of that act."
Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts over Non-Residents in Our Federal System, 43 CORNELL
L.Q. 196, 208 (1957).
80. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-46; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314-16.
81. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
82. Id. at 253 (unilateral activity of individual establishing bank account in one state then
moving to forum state not sufficient to require bank to defend against action in forum state).
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some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.""3
For example, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 4 the Court found
that a defendant's franchisee relationship with the forum-resident
franchisor constituted purposeful availment85 Conversely, in Kulko v.
Superior Court, 6 the Court held that a father who allowed his children
to spend more time in the forum state than was required under a separa-
tion agreement had not purposefully availed himself of the benefits and
protections of the forum state.s7 The rationale for the purposeful avail-
ment limitation, articulated by the Court in Burger King, is that it "en-
sures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of 'random,' 'fortuitous' or 'attenuated' contacts or of the 'unilat-
eral activity of another party or a third person.' "88 Rather, purposeful
availment limits assertions of jurisdiction to activities in the state that are
such that defendants have clear notice they are subject to suit there.8 9
The Court further developed the minimum contacts analysis to in-
clude foreseeability in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 9° The
aspect of foreseeability that the Court found critical to due process was
that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state be such
that he or she should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.91
For example, mere foreseeability that a product may enter the forum will
not be enough, by itself, to establish jurisdiction.92 Conversely, the de-
sign of a product in anticipation of sales in the forum, or advertising in
the forum, may suffice.93
2. Balancing interests to determine fairness and reasonableness
In addition to looking at the quantity and quality of the defendant's
activities in the forum, the Court performs a balancing test to assess the
fairness and reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction.94 The Court con-
83. Id.; accord Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
84. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
85. Id at 482.
86. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
87. Id. at 94.
88. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (citations omitted).
89. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
90. 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (non-resident car dealership which sold car involved in acci-
dent in forum state held not subject to forum state's jurisdiction).
91. Id
92. Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 111-12.
93. Id. at 112.
94. Id. at 113; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
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siders the following factors in making its assessment: (1) the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;9" (2) the burden on
the defendant;96 (3) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dis-
pute;97 and (4) interstate interests in efficient resolution of controversies
and furtherance of substantive social policies.98 Consideration of such a
variety of interests indicates the Court's growing commitment to the fair-
ness analysis.
As the minimum contacts analysis developed, the question which
came increasingly into focus was whether traditional bases of jurisdiction
which existed before International Shoe would include this same fairness
analysis or would stand on their own as per se methods of asserting juris-
diction.99 The constant factor in International Shoe and its progeny was
the assertion of jurisdiction over an absent defendant."c° None of the
minimum contact cases subsequent to International Shoe dealt with a
defendant that was properly served in the forum state. 01 Cases dealing
with an individual served within the forum state's territory were decided
on a physical power theory basis without a due process analysis.1 2 Simi-
larly, those cases basing jurisdiction on an absent defendant's property
within the state were decided on the basis of quasi in rem 103 rules of
jurisdiction.1" The fairness of the physical power theory and quasi in
rem jurisdiction were not questioned until the case of Shaffer v.
Heitner 
10 5
95. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
96. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97-98.
97. Id. at 98-101.
98. Id. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, for a discussion of all the factors.
99. See supra notes 32-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of pre-International
Shoe bases of jurisdiction..
100. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
101. See, e.g.,Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 106 (defendant Japanese corporation brought
in on cross-complaint in California); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 409
(defendant Colombian corporation sued in Texas); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288-
89 (defendant New York corporation sued in Oklahoma); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 87-88 (defendant
New York resident sued in California); Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238 (defendant Delaware corpora-
tion sued in Florida and served by mail).
102. See, e.g., New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1959) (forum had immediate personal
jurisdiction over individual by virtue of his presence within state); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F.
Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (service of defendant flying over forum held sufficient basis
for jurisdiction).
103. See supra note 9 for a definition of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
104. See Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886), overruled in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 212 (1977); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
105. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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D. Shaffer v. Heitner: Open Season on Settled Rules of Jurisdiction
In Shaffer v. Heitner, °6 the Supreme Court faced an assertion of
jurisdiction over an absent defendant based on quasi in rem attachment
of the defendant's property located within the forum." 7 Finding the
foundation in Pennoyer v. Neff 10 unstable, the Court addressed, for the
first time, whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice should
govern actions in rem as well as inpersonam. 1 In its analysis, the Shaf-
fer Court found history relevant, but not decisive.' 10
The Shaffer Court found that, in terms of its effect on a defendant,
an assertion of jurisdiction over property was the same as an assertion of
jurisdiction over the owner of that property.1 Both in rem and in per-
sonam assertions of jurisdiction affected the defendant's interest in prop-
erty."I2 According to the Shaffer Court, such interests in property may
be impinged upon only if the minimum contacts standard is satisfied.
1 13
The Court held that quasi in rem jurisdiction was an ancient form of
jurisdiction not supported by modern justification and that its continu-
ance would be fundamentally unfair to the defendant. 4 The Court con-
cluded, in sweeping language, "that all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington and its progeny." 1" To the extent
that prior decisions were inconsistent, they were overruled.
1 16
Shaffer, thus, cast a shadow of doubt over the remaining holding of
Pennoyer, that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sover-
eignty over persons and property within its territory." 1 7 Clearly, after
Shaffer, physical power over property was no longer a sufficient basis for
exercising jurisdiction. 18 Nonetheless, Shaffer left open the question of
whether a forum state possesses jurisdiction over persons by virtue of
106. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
107. Id. at 190-91.
108. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
109. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 206.
110. Id. at 211-12 ("History must be considered as supporting the proposition that jurisdic-
tion based solely on the presence of property satisfies the demands of due process... but it is
not decisive.").
111. Id. at 212.
112. Id. at 207.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 212.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 212 n.39.
117. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
118. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
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their mere presence within its territory.1 19 Following Shaffer, lower fed-
eral courts and commentators were split on this issue." Until Burnham
v. Superior Court, 2 ' the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue. As
a result, the area of personal jurisdiction was uncertain.' 2 2 By potentially
subjecting all assertions of jurisdiction to a minimum contacts analysis,
the Shaffer decision put a spotlight on those procedures which had yet to
be subjected to such an analysis.' 23
E. Transient Jurisdiction
Courts and commentators often use the physical power theory and
transient jurisdiction rule synonymously. 2 Yet, the physical power the-
ory, even after Shaffer v. Heitner,25 is much broader than the rule of
transient jurisdiction.' 26 The transient rule applies to an assertion of ju-
risdiction over an individual who, while fleetingly in the state, is served
with process in a cause of action unrelated to his or her presence in the
forum.' 27 True transient jurisdiction comes into play only when a dis-
119. The Shaffer Court formulated the issue as whether the due process analysis of Interna-
tional Shoe should be applied to in rem proceedings. Id. at 206. The Court then made a broad
statement that it should apply to all assertions of state-court jurisdiction. Id at 212.
120. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
121. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
122. This uncertainty is evidenced by conflicting sections in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24 (1986) ("A
state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a person if the person's relationship to the
state is such as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable.") with id. § 28 ("A state
has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its territory,
whether permanently or temporarily.") and id. § 28 comment a ("It can also be contended
that [this] rule is inconsistent with the basic principle of reasona6leness which underlies the
field of judicial jurisdiction.").
123. See, eg., Amusement Equip. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1985) (jurisdic-
tion based on service in state does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice); Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1985) (due
process precludes asserting jurisdiction over unincorporated association by in-state service on
its agent).
124. See, ag., Amusement Equip. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1985); Nehe-
miah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1985); Bernstine, supra
note 14, at 38; Comment, The "Transient Rule" of Personal Jurisdiction: 4 Well-Intentioned
Concept That Has Overstayed Its Welcome, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 181, 181 (1989).
125. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
126. The physical power theory was originally stated as follows: "[E]very State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory." Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). The Court in Shaffer modified this concept by holding
that physical power over property is no longer a sufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction, but
requires a fairness analysis as well. 433 U.S. at 212. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying
text.
127. Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth, O'Brien, A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REv. 721, 748, 752 (1988); Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 289.
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pute is not related to the individual's presence in the forum, such as in
the classic case of Grace v. MacArthur.128 In Grace, the defendant was
served while in an airplane flying over forum.129 Thus, the transient rule
represents the most extreme aspect of the physical power rule, yet it is
merely one piece of the physical power pie. The physical power rule is
much broader, covering the whole spectrum of "presence" from fleeting
presence to permanent domicile. Additionally, the physical power rule
covers all disputes, whether related to the individual's presence in the
forum or not. 130 Although ignored by the Burnham Court, these differ-
ences are crucial to understanding the transient jurisdiction controversy.
The evolution of the differences between the physical power rule and
transient jurisdiction rule is due in part to the increased mobility of soci-
ety. At the time of Pennoyer v. Neff, 3' the two rules were closely
aligned. The frequency of non-residents' visits to other states was low,
and the duration of their visits long.' 32 Thus, at the time of Pennoyer, a
transient defendant did not create a truly "fleeting" presence. Rather,
"transient" jurisdiction existed only in the sense that actions were "tran-
sitory" and followed the defendant wherever he or she went.133 Due to
the lack of rapid transportation, non-resident visitors to a forum state
had no choice but to build up contacts in the state by "residing as they
pass."' 34 Therefore, an assertion of jurisdiction was almost always based
on substantial contacts with the state,135 making a minimum contacts
analysis unnecessary. 136 The idea of a "transient" individual simply did
not embrace the degree of mobility it does today. 37 Accordingly, the
states' classic concern-that an individual would cause injury to a forum
128. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
129. Id. at 443.
130. The physical power theory is "dispute blind"-it does not take litigation-relatedness of
activity into account. Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. Rav. 610,
619 (1988).
131. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
132. Although railroads were rapidly developing in the nineteenth century, they were
mostly built to meet specific requirements in isolated local areas and were concentrated in the
Atlantic and Seaboard states. R. CRAM, A PICTURE HISTORY OF U.S. TRANSPORTATION 7
(1958). Where rail transportation was not available, horses, wagons and stages provided slow,
uncomfortable and unreliable transportation. Id. at 2, 9. Thus, for the most part, a "tran-
sient" individual during the time of Pennoyer could move only as fast as his or her horse. This
necessitated a longer stay in any state through which he or she traveled.
133. See Werner, supra note 14, at 569.
134. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (1990).
135. See R. CRAmB, supra note 132, at 2-3.
136. See Note, supra note 15, at 548.
137. Johnston, supra note 7, at 44-45.
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plaintiff and then leave the state before he or she could be served with
process-was a rare occurrence.
Changes in transportation and technology transformed this concern
into a real threat to a state's ability to protect its citizens.13  The dura-
tion and frequency of non-resident visits to other states changed tremen-
dously, giving rise to criticism of the transient rule.'39 For example, non-
resident visits to other states became shorter and more frequent. The
diminishing length of a defendant's stay was one factor that caused the
Court to modify the physical power iheory in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington . 4
After International Shoe, no matter how fleeting an actual physical
presence in a state was, if the defendant had minimum contacts with the
forum, the state could follow that defendant beyond its own territorial
borders to exercise personal jurisdiction.' 4 ' In ceasing to rely exclusively
on the concept of "physical presence,"' 42 the Court enabled states to
solve the problems caused by the more fleeting visits to forum states
made possible by rapid forms of transportation. 43
The International Shoe decision did not, however, resolve the corre-
sponding problem presented by the increased frequency of non-residents'
visits to other states. The Pennoyer premise that a state had power over
persons physically present within its territory' 44 remained intact after In-
ternational Shoe. 4 Yet, just as the brevity of visits to a forum poten-
tially exposed citizens of that forum to a risk of irreparable harm, the
increased frequency of visits to forum states exposed non-resident indi-
viduals to the risk of being forced to litigate in a distant forum.1 46 Thus,
the transient rule became a real threat to traveling non-residents.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that "all citizens
138. The first two decades of the twentieth century saw the beginning of mass production of
automobiles. R. CnRIB, supra note 132, at 92. Airlines and busses became major contenders
in the passenger market in the 1930s. Id. at 114. These forms of mass transportation in-
creased non-residents' visits to other states. Id. at 103-06.
139. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 308-09.
140. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The International Shoe Court had to deal with non-resident
corporations which were doing an increasing amount of business in other states. Rather than
rely on the fictional presence extension of the physical power theory, the Court replaced it with
the minimum contacts analysis. See id. at 316-17. See supra notes 45-66 and accompanying
text.
141. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
142. Id. at 316.
143. See supra notes 45-66 and accompanying text.
144. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
145. See, e.g., New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1959).
146. See, e.g., Grace, 170 F. Supp. at 443 (defendant was Illinois resident, sued in Arkansas
and served while flying over forum).
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[should] be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden
or restrict this movement." 47 The threat of litigation in a distant forum
with which the defendant has no contacts other than a fortuitous passing
constitutes a burden on that right. 148 The transient jurisdiction rule cre-
ates this threat, thereby burdening the right to travel. 4 9 Thus, as society
becomes more mobile, the transient rule creates greater risk of liability in
distant forums. Consequently, the burden on the right to travel in-
creases.1 50 This makes the rule of transient jurisdiction inherently un-
fair-each application of the rule further chills the exercise of a
fundamental right.
In sum, presence has come to have little meaning in terms of obliga-
tion. Individuals frequently travel through places simply because those
locations lie between where that individual is and his or her destina-
tion.' Clearly, a fleeting presence is weaker evidence of a jurisdictional
basis over an individual than an individual's ownership of property in a
forum.15 2 Property ownership indicates purposeful availment of the fo-
rum state's property laws and the obligation to pay taxes. 53 Yet such a
property interest alone has been held to be an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction.'54
Before Burnham v. Superior Court,"'5 the Court had never ad-
dressed transient jurisdiction in light of the fairness analysis established
by International Shoe and its progeny. 56 The Burnham Court appears
to address the difficulties presented by transient jurisdiction. In reality,
however, the Court ignores the core issue of unfairness inherent in the
transient jurisdiction rule by failing to acknowledge the different types of
presence embraced by the "physical power theory." 157 The Court's deci-
147. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
148. Comment, supra note 124, at 198.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Werner, supra note 14, at 588.
152. Id.
153. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-08.
154. Id. at 212.
155. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
156. In 1905, the Court dealt with the issue in Harris v. Balk, wherein it held a temporary
presence in the state alone was sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905),
overruled in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 & n.39 (1977). However, that decision was
handed down long before transportation developed to the point where the Court felt obligated
to erode the holding of Pennoyer and allow states to follow non-residents out of their territorial
boundaries in order to assert jurisdiction over them. See supra notes 45-66 and accompanying
text.
157. Justice Scalia focused on in-state service without reference to the "physical power the-
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sion ignores the spectrum of physical presence created by the evolution in
transportation.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: BURNHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT
A. Facts
Dennis and Francie Burnham were married in West Virginia in
1976.158 In 1977, they moved to New Jersey where they had two chil-
dren." 9 In 1987, the Burnhams separated"e and executed a marital set-
tlement agreement to be governed by New Jersey law.161 Shortly before
Francie departed for California, she and Dennis agreed that she would
take custody of the children and file for divorce-based on irreconcilable
differences.162
Dennis remained in New Jersey where he subsequently fied for di-
vorce on grounds of desertion. 163 Francie, after unsuccessfully demand-
ing that Dennis adhere to their prior agreement, brought suit for divorce
in a California Superior Court in early January 1988.1' Dennis had
taken periodic business trips to California in the past, 6 and in January,
1988, he arrived in Southern California on such a business trip.' 66 After
finishing business on January 21, he flew up to the San Francisco Bay
area to visit his children, and took his older child to San Francisco for
the weekend.' 67 Upon returning the child to Francie's home on January
24, 1988, Dennis was served with a California court summons and a copy
of the divorce petition.'
68
ory" or "transient jurisdiction" rule. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110-15. Justice Brennan
labeled jurisdiction based on service within the state as "transient jurisdiction." Id. at 2120 n.1
(Brennan, J., concurring).
158. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (1990).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2-3, Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105
(1990) (No. 89-44).
162. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
163. Id. The petitioner, Dennis, filed two separate divorce actions in New Jersey, both of
which were dismissed by a New Jersey superior court and both orders of dismissal were upheld
on appeal. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at app. 2, Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct.
2105 (1990) (No. 89-44).
164. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
165. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 19. Dennis had made at least one business trip to
California during each year of their marriage, except in 1984, and acknowledged receiving tax
advantages resulting from his activities in California. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to
Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105
(1990) (No. 89-44).
166. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 5.
167. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
168. Id.
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B. Procedural Background
Dennis made a special appearance 169 in the California Superior
Court to quash the service of process on the ground that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction because he had insufficient contacts with the fo-
rum.170 His wife argued that she did not need to prove her husband's
contacts with the forum because his service within the state sufficed as. a
basis for personal jurisdiction. 171
The trial court asserted both in rem and in personam jurisdiction
over Dennis,172 and the California Court of Appeal denied mandamus
relief, holding service within the forum state to be "a valid jurisdictional
predicate for in personam jurisdiction." ' The California Supreme
Court denied Dennis's petition for review.174 The United States Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider the question posed by Cali-
fornia's exercise of jurisdiction in this situation.
1 71
C. The Reasoning of the Court
1. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy.
176
Justice Scalia described the criteria of due process analysis as resting
upon "well established principles" and "traditional notions." 177 He then
employed these criteria to establish a new approach to due process. 178
Justice Scalia first examined the tradition behind the physical power
169. "A special appearance is for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of service or the
jurisdiction of the court... ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 89 (5th ed. 1979).
170. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct 2105, 2109 (1990).
171. Brief for Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-5, Burnham v. Superior Court,
110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (No. 89-44). Respondent relied on section 28 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws for the principle that " 'a state has power to exercise judicial jurisdic-
tion over an individual who is present within its territory, whether permanently or
temporarily."' Id. (quoting REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1986)).
172. Brief for Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 3. The trial court originally
asserted jurisdiction solely over the marital status but not over Dennis as an individual, but
then granted Francie's request for reconsideration and asserted personal jurisdiction over Den-
nis. Brief for Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 1.
173. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109 (quoting Brief for Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari at
app. 5, Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (No. 89-44)).
174. Brief for Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 7.
175. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 47 (1989).
176. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2108 (1990). Justice White joined the
opinion in Sections I, II-A, B and C, but did not agree with Justice Scalia's traditional due
process approach. Id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 2110.
178. See id. at 2116-17.
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rule.179 He downplayed the fact that others had found the history of
presence-based jurisdiction unclear.1" He pointed out, rather, that when
the fourteenth amendment"8 l was adopted, and through the early twenti-
eth century, many state courts "held that personal service upon a physi-
cally present defendant sufficed to confer jurisdiction."'8 2 Additionally,
he stated, most states had statutes or common-law rules negating per-
sonal jurisdiction over individuals who were brought into the forum by
force or fraud. 8 3 According to Justice Scalia, all the cases since 1978
which invalidated jurisdiction based on presence alone had erroneously
interpreted Shaffer v. Heitner.'8 4
Justice Scalia then traced the expansion of the territorial limit rule
articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff' through the fictional "consent" and
"presence" theories.186 He noted that International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton 187 replaced those theories with the concept that "the defendant's liti-
gation-related 'minimum contacts' may take the place of physical
presence as the basis for jurisdiction."' 88 Justice Scalia asserted, how-
ever, that nothing in International Shoe or subsequent cases supported
the proposition that physical presence alone was no longer sufficient to
establish jurisdiction. 18 9
In his approach to due process, Justice Scalia posited that there was
a distinct difference between the due process analysis applied to support
novel procedures and to sustain traditional ones.' 90 Justice Scalia found
that "jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitute[d] due pro-
cess because it [was] one of the continuing traditions of our legal system
that define[d] the due process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play
179. Id. at 2110-13.
180. Id. at 2111. Justice Brennan took issue with Justice Scalia on this point, pointing out
that British cases "'evidence a judicial intent to limit the rules to those instances where their
application is consonant with the demands of 'fair play' and 'substantial justice."" Id. at
2122 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Note, British Precedents for Due Process Limita-
tions on In Personam Jurisdiction, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 610-11 (1948)).
181. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868).
182. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111. Justice Scalia stated that 1868 was the "crucial time" for
purposes of this case. Id.
183. Id. at 2112.
184. Id. at 2113 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)).
185. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Pennoyer Court held that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established." Id. at 720.
186. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2114. The fictional consent theory was previously articulated
in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). The fictional presence theory was previously
articulated in Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
187. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
188. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2114.
189. Id. at 2115.
190. Id.
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and substantial justice.' "191
Justice Scalia continued 192 by stressing the fact that "Shaffer, like
International Shoe, involved jurisdiction over an absent defendant," not
a non-resident served within the state. 193 Justice Scalia concluded that
the language in Shaffer, stating that "all assertions of state-court jurisdic-
tion must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny,"' 194 meant only that quasi in rem and in
personam jurisdiction are the same thing. 191 He found that Shaffer stood
for nothing more than the proposition that when the "minimum contact"
that is a substitute for physical presence consists of property ownership,
it must, like other contacts, be related to the litigation. 96 Thus, Justice
Scalia concluded that the logic of Shaffer's holding did not compel the
conclusion that physically present defendants must be treated identically
to absent ones.
19 7
Justice Scalia then established a new approach to the due process
question, conceding it would diverge from that taken in Shaffer.191 Un-
like the Shaffer majority, Justice Scalia did not conduct an independent
inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the prevailing in-state service
rule. 199 He pointed out that language in Shaffer suggested that due pro-
cess could be as readily offended by old rules as by new rules.2 °° Justice
Scalia, however, distinguished Shaffer's due process analysis as only ap-
plying when such old rules are utilized by a minority of states, such as
the situs of stock rule in Shaffer.
20 1
On this basis, Justice Scalia concluded that the due process clause
191. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Justice
Scalia first established the "tradition" of the physical power rule and then defined due process
as being met by traditional rules. See id. at 2110-15. Thus, he held the pedigree of the rule
was its validation.
192. At this point, Justice White no longer joined in the opinion. He disagreed with Justice
Scalia's traditional due process approach. Id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 2115.
194. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
195. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116.
196. Id. at 2115.
197. Id. at 2116.
198. Id.
199. Compare id. with Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
200. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116 ("Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as
by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitu-
tional heritage.").
201. Justice Scalia's reference to "old rules" focused on the unique situs of the stock rule of
Delaware in Shaffer, rather than the much followed rule of quasi in rem jurisdiction upon
which the Shaffer Court actually focused. Id.
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required a dual jurisdictional analysis.2 ' 2 For new procedures the Court
must "determine whether 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice' have been offended."2 "3 He reasoned, however, that "a doctrine
of personal jurisdiction that dates back to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and is still generally observed unquestionably meets that
standard." 2" In other words, if a rule is "traditional" it automatically
meets due process; if not, a reasonableness inquiry may be required." 5
2. Justice Brennan's concurrence
Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by Justices O'Connor, Mar-
shall and Blackmun, agreed with Justice Scalia's holding that due pro-
cess generally permits the exercise of jurisdiction based upon service
within the forum state.20 6 Justice Brennan, however, "d[id] not perceive
the need.., to decide that a jurisdictional rule... automatically com-
ports with due process simply by virtue of its 'pedigree.' "207
In his opinion, Justice Brennan found Justice Scalia's approach was
foreclosed by the Court's decisions in International Shoe and Shaffer.
20 8
According to Justice Brennan, "[t]he critical insight of Shaffer is that all
rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporaneous
notions of due process," as defined by International Shoe and its prog-
eny. °9 Justice Brennan noted that the history of a given rule must be
considered, but cannot be decisive.210
Justice Brennan then examined the so-called "pedigree" of the tran-
sient jurisdiction rule and found it historically debatable rather than well
202. Id. at 2116-17. Justice Scalia found a fundamental distinction between what is needed
to support novel procedures and what is needed to sustain traditional ones. Id. at 2115.
203. Id. at 2116 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
204. Id. at 2116-17. Justice Scalia cited the following cases to support this approach:
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
205. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119.
206. Id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
207. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
208. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). He noted that "[fn International Shoe, [the Court] held
that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction does not violate the Due Process Clause if
it is consistent with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Justice
Brennan further observed that "[in Shaffer, [the Court] stated that 'all assertions of state-
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe
and its progeny."' Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212
(1977) (emphasis added by Justice Brennan)).
209. Id. at 2120-21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
210. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). "If we could discard an 'ancient form without substan-
tial modem justification' in Shaffer, we can do so again." Id. at 2121 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977)).
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settled as Justice Scalia had suggested.2 1  The rule was a stranger to the
common law and only weakly implanted in American jurisprudence
when the fourteenth amendment was adopted.212 Furthermore, Justice
Brennan explained that the rule did not receive wide recognition until
after the Court's decision in Pennoyer.213
Justice Brennan found that the historical background was relevant
because "the fact that American courts have announced the rule for per-
haps a century... provides a defendant voluntarily present in a particu-
lar state today 'clear notice that [he or she] is subject to suit' in the
forum." '214 Justice Brennan reasoned that a defendant visiting another
state assumes the risk that the state will exercise its power over his or her
property or person.215
Justice Brennan recognized that there was a limit to risk assumption
by the pure transient when "'the individual's relationship to the state
[was] so attenuated as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreason-
able.' ",216 He pointed out that the facts of Burnham did not require the
Court to determine the outer limits of the transient jurisdiction rule,217
yet, Justice Brennan analyzed those outer limits. According to Justice
Brennan, by simply visiting the forum, a defendant avails himself or her-
self of significant benefits provided by the state, such as police, fire and
emergency medical services.218
Finally, Justice Brennan noted, "Without transient jurisdiction, an
asymmetry would arise: a transient would have the full benefit of the
power of the forum State's courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity
from their authority as a defendant. ' 21 9 In addition, the potential bur-
dens on a transient defendant are slight due to modem transportation
and communications.22° He concluded, "as a rule the exercise of per-
211. Id. at 2122 (Brennan, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 2122-23 (Brennan, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 2123-24 (Brennan, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 2124 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
215. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring); see Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
216. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1986)). According to Justice Brennan, such a circum-
stance would only occur when a defendant's presence was involuntary or unknowing. Id. at
2126 (Brennan, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 2124 n.11 (Brennan, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 2124 (Brennan, J., concurring). Additionally, the privileges and immunities
clause prevents a state from discriminating against a transient defendant by denying him such
protections or the right of access to its courts. Id. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring); see U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; supra note 29 and accompanying text.
219. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring).
220. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Any burdens arising could be ameliorated by a variety
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sonal jurisdiction over a defendant based on his voluntary presence in the
forum will satisfy the requirements of due process."221 As to the peti-
tioner, Dennis, Justice Brennan concluded that he was served while vol-
untarily and knowingly in the forum, and therefore, was subject to the
forum court's jurisdiction.222
3. Justice Scalia's response to Justice Brennan's concurrence
Justice Scalia, in responding to Justice Brennan's concurrence, as-
serted that "contemporary notions of due process" applicable to personal
jurisdiction are the "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice'" established in International Shoe.223 The key word to him was
"traditional." '224 Justice Scalia stated that Brennan's proposed standard
of due process would measure jurisdictional rules against each Justice's
subjective assessment of what is fair, rather than as they should be mea-
sured-against traditional doctrines.22
Justice Scalia then examined the fairness of California's assertion of
jurisdiction in the Burnham case. He found the three days of benefits
Dennis received before being served "inadequate to establish.., that it is
'fair' for California to decree the ownership of all Dennis's worldly
goods."226 Justice Scalia noted, rather, that it would have been unfair to
assert jurisdiction over Dennis if he had returned to New Jersey without
being served.22 7 He explained, however, that asserting jurisdiction in this
case was not unfair.22 The continuing tradition of presence-based juris-
diction, which anyone entering California should have known about, ren-
dered it fair for Dennis to be sued there because he was served while
present in the state.229 Justice Scalia concluded that when the Court is
dealing with "the very baseline of reasonableness, physical presence,"
there is no need for a free standing reasonableness inquiry.230
of procedural devices. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan referred to venue, forum
non conveniens and inexpensive discovery methods as devices to aid the transient defendant.
Id. at 2125 n.13. (Brennan, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 2126 (Brennan, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 2117 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(emphasis added by Justice Scalia)).
224. Id. at 2118.
225. Id. at 2117.
226. Id. The benefits listed by Justice Brennan and referred to by Justice Scalia included
guarantees of health and safety by the state's police, fire and emergency services, travel on
state's roads and waterways and enjoyment of the fruits of the state's economy. Id.
227. Id. at 2117-18.
228. Id. at 2118.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2119.
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4. Justice White's and Justice Stevens' concurring opinions
Justice White concurred separately to emphasize his disagreement
with Justice Scalia's due process analysis. 23  He stated that jurisdiction
based on service within the forum "has been and is so widely accepted
throughout this country that [he] could not possibly strike it down.)
232
He stressed, however, that "the Court has the authority under the [Four-
teenth] Amendment to examine even traditionally accepted procedures
and declare them invalid. ' 23 3 In such an examination, a rule must be
found "so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances
that it should be held violative of Due Process in every case."
'234 Until
such a showing is made, and as long as presence in the forum state is
intentional, individual cases claiming that the rule operated unfairly as
applied to the particular non-resident need not be entertained.235
Justice Stevens concurred separately, affirming the assertion of juris-
diction over Dennis. 236 He stated that he would not join the other opin-
ions in this case for the same reason he did not join the majority in
Shaffer-he found them all too broad.237 Justice Stevens thought the
combination of historical evidence, fairness and common sense identified
by the other Justices made this a very easy case.
238
V. ANALYSIS
The narrow holding of Burnham v. Superior Court 2 39 is quite clear
and is supported by a majority of the Court. In all but the most extreme
circumstances, 240 a state may assert jurisdiction over a non-resident who
is within its borders, even if the individual is there only temporarily and
for reasons unrelated to the litigation.24 This holding validates both the
231. Id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 2119 (White, J., concurring).
233. Id. (White, J., concurring) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)).
234. Id. at 2120 (White, J., concurring).
235. Id. (White, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 2126 (Stevens, 3., concurring).
237. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
238. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
239. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
240. According to Justice Brennan and Justice White, an extreme circumstance in which a
state may not assert jurisdiction over a non-resident individual occurs when the individual's
presence is involuntary or unknowing. Id. at 2120 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2124 n. 11,
2126 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia did not specify any exceptions, but noted that some state statutes exempt
individuals from service when brought into the forum by force, fraud or as a witness in unre-
lated proceedings. Id. at 2112.
241. Id. at 2115; id. at 2120 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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physical power theory and the transient jurisdiction rule simultaneously.
The problem is that the physical power theory and transient jurisdiction
rule are not the same.242 The Court's failure to recognize the difference
between the two rules resulted in its ignoring the controversy which un-
derlies the transient jurisdiction rule.24
In resurrecting the physical power theory after Shaffer v. Heitner,24
the Burnham decision creates a broader due process holding as well. Un-
fortunately, the Court's approach to due process is splintered and un-
clear, with no analysis supported by a majority of the Court. The
question left open by Shaffer as to whether minimum contacts applied
across the board to all assertions of jurisdiction was actually aggravated
by Burnham. The question now is which of the many due process analy-
ses established by the Court applies and when.
A. The Court's Treatment of Transient Jurisdiction
Rather than address the transient jurisdiction rule as a separate
problem, the Court in Burnham v. Superior Court24 combined it with its
discussion of the physical power theory.2' The result was broad due
process analyses covering both physical power and the transient rule.
The Court labeled the assertion of jurisdiction in this case an exercise of
the transient rule, without addressing what facts made Dennis, the peti-
tioner, a transient defendant.247 The specific facts suggested that Den-
nis's activities in the forum were more substantial than the brief, isolated
visit that the transient rule covered.248 Furthermore, a visit to the resi-
dence of his wife and children could be considered an activity related to
the divorce litigation, which would also put him outside the transient
jurisdiction rule.249 The Court never analyzed these facts.25 °
242. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
243. Pure transient jurisdiction was not the issue before the Court, as Dennis, the peti-
tioner, had more contacts with the forum than the classic transient defendant, thereby estab-
lishing more than a mere transient presence. The Court addressed it nevertheless. See infra
notes 427-49 for a discussion of petitioner's contacts with California.
244. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
245. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
246. See id. at 2110-15; id. at 2120 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
247. See id. at 2110-15; id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2124-26 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
248. The petitioner, Dennis, visited California regularly on business. See infra notes 427-49
and accompanying text for a discussion of petitioner's contacts with California.
249. Petitioner was dropping his daughter off at his wife's house when served. See supra
notes 167-68 and accompanying text. The transient jurisdiction rule concerns service when
activities in the forum are unrelated to the litigation. See supra note 14.
250. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110-19; id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2120-
26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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In sum, the Court kept a blind focus on mere presence and decided
the case solely on that basis.2"' By equating physical power and transient
jurisdiction, the Court avoided the necessity of confronting the unfair-
ness posed by true cases of transient jurisdiction. 52 The Court's analysis
was contrary to the suggestion of courts and commentators that the tran-
sient rule was really an aspect of the minimum contacts doctrine and
should be abolished due to its inherent unfairness.2 53 Resurrection of the
physical power theory comes at the cost of unfairness to a large and
growing group of non-resident interstate travelers embraced by the tran-
sient jurisdiction rule.254
B. The Burnham Court's Due Process Smorgasbord
The decision in Burnham v. Superior Court 215 provided a variety of
due process analyses from which lower courts may choose when evaluat-
ing other bases of jurisdiction. In his traditional due process analysis,
Justice Scalia refused to perform any independent fairness inquiry.
25 6
Although Justice Brennan claimed to apply an independent inquiry into
the fairness of transient jurisdiction, his analysis seemed hollow. 257 Like-
wise, Justice White paid lip service to the fairness inquiry, but refused to
reach the issue until a rule is shown to be arbitrary and lacking in com-
mon sense in a large number of cases.258 Yet, even with their opposing
viewpoints, the opinions all came to the same result. Due process gener-
251. See id. at 2110-15. The California Court of Appeal upheld the assertion ofjurisdiction
based solely on the physical presence of Dennis in the forum when served. Id. at 2109. Both
parties argued the minimum contacts issue before the United States Supreme Court. Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 18-19, 31-33, Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990)
(No. 89-44).
252. See supra notes 124-57 and accompanying text.
253. Sea eg., Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 47-48 (3d Cir.
1985) (service of unincorporated association's agent within forum insufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion, minimum contacts analysis required); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, 626
F. Supp. 305, 310-13 (N.D. I1. 1986) (interpreted Shaffer as destroying transient jurisdiction
rule and requiring minimum contacts analysis for all in personam actions); hershaw v.
Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985) (service during defendant's
transient presence in forum held insufficient basis for jurisdiction); Bernstine, supra note 14, at
61; Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 311-12.
254. See supra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
255. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
256. Id. at 2116.
257. See id. at 2124-26 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan did not properly address
purposeful availment and totally ignored the lack of litigation-related activities of a transient,
which are both key to the minimum contacts analysis. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320,
329 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
258. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring).
[Vol. 24:851
INTERNATIONAL SHOE GETS THE BOOT
ally allows an assertion of jurisdiction based solely on service within the
state, no matter how fleeting or unrelated to the litigation the visit is.
259
1. Tradition as a measure of due process
Justice Scalia's due process approach rests on the premise that Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington 21 was meant to establish an additional
basis of jurisdiction, supplementing the existing physical power rule.261
This makes sense in light of the Court's emphasis on physical presence
prior to and within the International Shoe opinion. It does not, however,
necessarily follow that the due process analysis established in Interna-
tional Shoe was a new form of due process. 62 The minimum contacts
analysis was meant merely to define the notions of "fair play and sub-
stantial justice" the Court found crucial to due process.263
International Shoe expanded the states' ability to assert jurisdiction
beyond the physical power theory. At the same time, it cast doubt upon
the justification for that theory by abolishing one of the two principles
established in Pennoyer v. Neff,2 4 that no state can exercise jurisdiction
over persons outside its territory.2 6 Shaffer v. Heitner2 66 expressly re-
jected another portion of the physical power theory by holding that the
presence of property alone was an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.267
The Court in both International Shoe and Shaffer thus concluded that
portions of the physical power theory no longer comported with due pro-
cess notions of fairness.
268
Nevertheless, in Burnham, Justice Scalia distinguished the physical
power theory from the fairness theory by focusing exclusively on its basis
in tradition.269 A traditional rule, such as the physical power theory,
259. Id. at 2119; id. at 2120 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring).
260. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
261. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2114. Justice Scalia found that "the defendant's litigation-
related 'minimum contacts' may take the place of physical presence as the basis for jurisdic-
tion." Id. In coming to this conclusion, Justice Scalia relied on language from International
Shoe:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 2114-15 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
262. See infra notes 408-12 and accompanying text.
263. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
264. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
265. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
266. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
267. Id. at 212.
268. See id.; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
269. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
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automatically comported with due process simply by virtue of its pedi-
gree.27 A novel procedure, because it cannot be justified simply on the
basis of tradition, requires an'independent analysis in terms of its fair
play and substantial justice.271 This insulation of traditional bases of ju-
risdiction from any fairness inquiry is unprecedented in personal jurisdic-
tion cases and ignores the evolutionary nature of law, as well as the
holdings of several key personal jurisdiction cases. 2
a. the evolution of the law
If the Shaffer Court had applied Justice Scalia's traditional due pro-
cess analysis, the result would have been different because quasi in rem
attachment was traditionally used to achieve jurisdiction.273 The Shaffer
Court explicitly disapproved of such an analysis, rejecting the assertion
that history was decisive. 274 The Court in Shaffer held that old rules of
jurisdiction can offend due process as easily as new rules.2"
Justice Scalia attempted to distinguish Shaffer from Burnham by
reasoning that the history involved in Shaffer was only a minority
rule.276 The problem with that suggestion, however, is that Justice Scalia
focused on Delaware's unique situs of corporate stock rule in Shaffer,2 "
which was in fact a minority rule.27 8 The Shaffer Court's actual focus
was not on the situs rule, but rather the well-established principle of
quasi in rem jurisdiction.279 In reality, the Shaffer decision abolished a
basis of jurisdiction with a longer "settled usage" than either the physical
power theory or the transient jurisdiction rule.280
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2119.
272. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211-12.
"The social conditions underlying the [physical power] rule have changed, and the principle
that 'due process is ancient process' should not apply in the face of fundamental factual
changes." Comment, supra note 27, at 938.
273. Justice Scalia distinguished Shaffer as resting on Delaware's unique situs of corporate
stock rule. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116 n.4. The opinion, however, clearly rested on the
insufficiency of property in the forum as a sole basis for jurisdiction. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
212-13.
274. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211-12.
275. Id. at 212.
276. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116.
277. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1975) makes Delaware the situs of ownership of all
stock in Delaware corporations. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192.
278. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116 n.4.
279. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212-13.
280. Quasi in rem jurisdiction was recognized by Pennoyer itself. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at
723. For a discussion of the history of the quasi in rem rule of jurisdiction, see Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921); Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Summons After
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The cases cited by Justice Scalia to support the history of transient
jurisdiction represent isolated cases where jurisdiction was based solely
on service of an individual who was fleetingly present in the forum.281
These pre-Pennoyer cases282 did not set forth a due process analysis be-
cause there was no perceived need for one at the time.283 Relying on
physical presence to the exclusion of fairness may have made Sense when
limited mobility forced travelers to actually reside as they passed through
a state.284 In contrast, travelers now may enter a state without even
knowing it.285 It is this type of evolution in society which has historically
led to the reevaluation of rules of law to ensure that the requirements of
due process are continuously met.286 Justice Scalia's approach, looking
at the original use of a rule while ignoring its evolution, would freeze the
changing fabric of the law.287
b. misapplied precedent
Furthermore, Justice Scalia's traditional due process analysis in
Burnham appears unsupported by precedent. The cases cited by Justice
Scalia to support the traditional due process analysis, with the exception
of Ownbey v. Morgan,288 were not personal jurisdiction cases.28 9 Even
Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L. REv. 505, 506 (1978). See supra notes 31-123 for a discussion of
the evolution of the physical power theory. See supra notes 124-57 for a discussion of the
evolution of the transient jurisdiction rule. Justice Brennan pointed out that the "settled us-
age" of the transient jurisdiction rule is not at all certain. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2122-24
(Brennan, J., concurring).
281. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110-11.
282. Some of the cases cited were decided before ratification of the fourteenth amendment.
See, e.g., Murphy v. J.S. Winter & Co., 18 Ga. 690 (1855) (persons found within limits of
government, whether residence is permanent or temporary, are subject to that government's
jurisdiction); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354 (1819) (contractual obligations follow person
of debtor wherever he or she may go). See supra notes 131-54 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how the transient rule of jurisdiction differed during the rise of the physical
power theory.
283. See Bernstine, supra note 14, at 60.
284. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (defendant served
while flying over forum state). Undoubtedly, not all pilots make an announcement to their
passengers every time they cross a state line. Even if they do, it is too late for the unwary
passenger to do anything to avoid service.
286. Otherwise, use of jurisdictional doctrine based upon applications of ancient labels will
promote mechanistic determinations of adjudicatory authority and obscure realistic principles
of reason and fairness. Comment, supra note 16, at 78-79.
287. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111; Leflar, The Converging Limits of State Jurisdictional
Powers, 9 J. PuB. LAW 282, 291-92 (1960-61); Comment, supra note 27, at 938.
288. 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (jurisdiction based on quasi in rem attachment of defendant's prop-
erty held valid).
289. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116. Justice Scalia relied on Ownbey, 256 U.S. 94;
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Ownbey, a quasi in rem jurisdiction case, was of doubtful validity after
Shaffer.2" Another case on which Justice Scalia relied, Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia,29' considered whether an indictment by grand jury was required
in a state prosecution for murder.292 The Hurtado Court's due process
discussion suggested that, rather than tradition, progressive growth and
adaptation to new circumstances were the more appropriate focus when
defining due process.293 The final case Justice Scalia used to support a
traditional due process analysis was Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co. ;294 however, this case dealt primarily with the constitu-
tionality of an act of Congress relating to the treasury, an issue far from
the realm of personal jurisdiction.295 Thus, none of these cases was on
point. Furthermore, only one was decided in this century. As such, they
can hardly be used as authority to diverge so completely from Shaffer,
which directly discussed, albeit in dictum, the proper due process analy-
sis to be used for assertions of personal jurisdiction.296
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (indictment by grand jury not required in state
prosecution for murder); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1856) (distress warrant issued under Act of Congress did not deprive defendant of
liberty or property without due process of law).
290. The jurisdictional basis in Ownbey was declared invalid by Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212
n.39. The Ownbey Court described the tradition of quasi in rem jurisdiction as "customarily
employed, long before the Revolution, in the commercial metropolis of England . .. .
Ownbey, 256 U.S. at 111. The Shaffer Court's abolition of reliance on property alone as a basis
for jurisdiction undermines Justice Scalia's argument that such traditional procedures auto-
matically comport with due process. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
291. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
292. Id. at 520.
293. See id. at 530-31. The Hurtado Court acknowledged that the Constitution "was made
for an undefined and expanding future." Id. The decision suggested that it was better not to
go too far back into antiquity to determine what constitutes due process. See id. at 530.
Rather, the spirit of personal liberty is best preserved and developed by progressive growth and
wise adaptation to new circumstances. Id. Thus, the Hurtado Court did not support the
extreme position Justice Scalia advocated in Burnham.
294. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
295. Id. at 274.
296. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-12. The explicit rejection of a solely tradition based due
process analysis in Shaffer, accompanied by the Court's other jurisdictional due process analy-
ses on the basis of fairness and substantial justice, simply present more compelling authority
than cases dealing with other issues and which were decided in 1856, 1884 and 1921.
Additionally, the authorities cited by Justice Scalia are no less persuasive than the Court's
discussion of due process in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled on other
grounds in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which specifically examined and discredited
the Court's reasoning in Hurtado upon which Justice Scalia relied:
It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled in English law at the time of the
emigration, and brought to this country and practiced by our ancestors, is an essen-
tial element of due process of law. If that were so the procedure of the first half of
the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a
straight-jacket, only to be unloosened by constitutional amendment. That . . .
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2. Justice Brennan's gutting of the minimum contacts analysis
If Justice Brennan applied a minimum contacts analysis, he changed
it drastically. At first blush, his concurrence appears to be based on the
standard set out by Shaffer that "all assertions of... jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and
its progeny."'2 97 Yet, in application, his analysis broke down. He paid
tribute to the fairness doctrine,2 98 but found almost anything to be
fair.2 99 Furthermore, he completely ignored one crucial factor-the con-
nection between the litigation and the individual's contacts with the fo-
rum." c This connection has been pervasive in the Court's due process
analyses since International Shoe.30 '
Justice Brennan labeled his preferred analysis as minimum con-
tacts.302 Yet, rather than apply the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny, he applied a two-step analysis, foreign to personal
jurisdiction.303 First, he looked to the history of the transient rule.3°
Second, he examined the fairness of transient jurisdiction in the abstract
without addressing the specific facts of the case before the Court.305
Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia had different reasons for the rele-
vance of history to the due process analysis. According to Justice Bren-
nan, the historical background of the transient jurisdiction rule affords a
defendant voluntarily present in a particular state clear notice that he or
she may be subject to suit there.301 Several reasons make this approach
more sensible than the traditional due process analysis employed by Jus-
tice Scalia. First, notice and an opportunity to be heard are "elementary
"would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of
progress or improvement."
Id. at 101 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884)); accord Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 65-66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds
in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
297. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
298. Justice Brennan claimed to undertake an independent inquiry into the fairness of the
prevailing in-state service rule. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
299. See id. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
300. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
301. See, eg., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414-15 (claims against de-
fendant did not arise out of defendant's activities in forum and defendant did not carry on
continuous and systematic business contacts, jurisdiction invalid); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213
(property defendant possessed in forum state not related to litigation, jurisdiction invalid).
302. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2121 (Brennan, J., concurring).
303. See id. at 2122-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
304. Id. at 2122-24 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan defined transient jurisdic-
tion as jurisdiction premised solely on service while in the forum, thereby making it synony-
mous with the physical power rule; see id. at 2120 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
305. Id. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 2124 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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and fundamental" requirements of due process.3 °7 Second, the progeny
of International Shoe incorporate this concept into their due process
analyses by requiring that the defendant's connection with the forum be
such that he or she should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.30 8 While history in this context is clearly relevant, it should not be
decisive.30 9
Justice Brennan, however, treated history as nearly decisive. He
found a presumption of due process validity based solely on the historical
background of the rule.310 He described the presumption as "strong,"
but never discussed how it could be rebutted. 31' Apparently, a sufficient
showing of unfairness could rebut the presumption; 312 however, Justice
Brennan did not find such a showing in Burnham.313 In fact, he never
addressed the issue of whether it was fair to assert jurisdiction over the
petitioner, Dennis, based on his contacts with the forum.314 Rather, he
considered the fairness of asserting jurisdiction over an abstract transient
defendant and then summarily affirmed the assertion of jurisdiction over
Dennis.
31 5
Justice Brennan slid into his fairness analysis in a haphazard man-
ner, addressing some factors of the minimum contacts test while ignoring
others.316 The most disturbing aspect of his opinion is that he did not
analyze the specific facts of the case before the Court.317 Such an ap-
proach is contrary to the Court's previous minimum contact analyses.318
The danger in this approach is tremendous, for it is tantamount to up-
holding transient jurisdiction in virtually all cases without considering
fairness. This, in effect, is the same result reached by Justice Scalia.
Justice Brennan examined the benefits that a visit to a forum state
307. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
308. See, eg., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
309. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211-12.
310. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124 (Brennan, J., concurring).
311. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
312. This can be implied from the structure of Justice Brennan's analysis. Justice Brennan
established the transient rule's presumption of due process and then proceeded to a fairness
analysis, thereby suggesting the fairness factors could change the result. See id. at 2124-25
(Brennan, J., concurring). He also pointed out that tradition alone is not dispositive. Id. at
2122 (Brennan, I., concurring). It therefore follows that since his presumption was based
solely on historical background that presumption, likewise, should not have been dispositive.
313. Id. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
314. See id. 2124-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
315. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
316. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
317. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
318. See; eg., Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 113-16; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-85;
World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-99; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-56 (1958).
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confers.3 19 While in the forum, the transient defendants' health and
safety are guaranteed and they can enjoy the fruits of the state's econ-
omy.32° Arguably, this conduct is not the type of purposeful availment
envisioned by the Court in Hanson v. Denckla,321 Kulko v. Superior
Court,322 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,323 Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz,324 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.325
These decisions speak of purposefully availing oneself of the "privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum State, ' 326 or creating con-
tinuing obligations with residents of the forum.327  Justice Brennan
acknowledged that this was the proper test, but he did not apply it in his
analysis. 328 His idea of purposeful availment seemed to be the mere act
of a transient defendant entering the state's territory,329 while the Court's
approach in the past had focused on the particular activities of the actual
defendant in the forum.3 30
Justice Brennan argued that an asymmetry would arise if transient
jurisdiction were not allowed. 331 The transient defendant would have the
benefits of the forum state's courts as a plaintiff, while at the same time
retaining immunity as a defendant. 332 The problem with this reasoning,
however, is that a plaintiff never needs to enter a forum state to use its
courts.333 Any plaintiff who uses another state's courts will create this
asymmetry, regardless of whether he or she visits that forum.
Finally, Justice Brennan examined the burdens on a transient de-
319. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
320. Id. at 2125 (Brennan, ., concurring).
321. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (unilateral activity of individual establishing bank account in
one state then moving to forum state insufficient to require bank to defend against action in
forum state).
322. 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978) (unilateral activity of parent choosing to spend time in forum
state while having custody of child insufficient to require other parent to defend against action
in forum).
323. 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (purposeful availment may be met by manufacturer or
distributor serving market for its products in other states).
324. 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985) (franchisee relationship with forum state franchisor con-
stituted purposeful availment).
325. 480 U.S. 102, 108-13 (1987) (placement of product into stream of commerce without
more is not act of defendant purposefully directed toward forum state).
326. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; accord Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 112-13.
327. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76.
328. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
329. Id. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
330. See Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 112-13; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-
98; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
331. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring).
332. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
333. The privileges and immunities clause requires that each state afford non-residents the
same access to its courts as that afforded to its domiciliaries. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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fendant.334 He noted that such burdens generally would be slight due to
modem transportation and communication.33 Moreover, the fact that
the defendant had visited the forum indicated that suit in that state
would not likely be prohibitively inconvenient.336 In a minimum con-
tacts analysis, this reasoning is relatively insignificant, as it would make
anyone who steps over, or who could have stepped over the state line,
subject to jurisdiction. In contrast, the minimum contacts analysis estab-
lished in International Shoe focused on the relationship between the de-
fendant, the forum and the litigation.337 Never before has a fleeting visit,
without more, been held to establish the requisite relationship for mini-
mum contacts.
As part of his due process analysis, Justice Brennan also considered
procedural devices which a transient defendant could use, such as venue
and forum non conveniens. 338 He found such devices could ameliorate
the burdens on a non-resident defendant. 339 The availability of such de-
vices, however, does not answer the threshold question of whether, in the
instant case, the burdens on the petitioner, Dennis, made the exercise of
jurisdiction violative of due process. 3"
The due process clause is a constitutional limitation on a court's
power to assert jurisdiction over an individual.341 Conversely, proce-
dural devices such as venue and forum non conveniens are, respectively,
statutorily and judicially conceived limitations, applied subsequent to a
determination of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction.3 42 Although
they may be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of an
assertion of jurisdiction, because their application is discretionary, it
would stretch due process to allow these devices to remedy an otherwise
invalid jurisdictional basis.34 3
Justice Brennan concluded his analysis without any reference to the
relationship between the defendant's activity in the forum and the litiga-
334. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring).
335. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
336. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
337. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
338. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125 & n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring).
339. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
340. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.10, at 128
(1985).
341. See id. § 3.10, at 124.
342. Id. § 2.1, at 11; id. § 2.17, at 88-89. Venue is designed to balance the objectives of
optimum convenience to parties and efficient allocation of resources. Id. § 2.1, at 11. Forum
non conveniens permits a court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction when the litigation could
have been brought more appropriately in another forum. Id. § 2.17, at 88-89.
343. See Werner, supra note 14, at 590-91.
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tion. By failing to address specific jurisdiction, Justice Brennan, in effect,
validated an exercise of general, dispute-blind 3" jurisdiction, previously
allowed only where extensive contacts existed.345
Justice Brennan's fairness analysis of the transient rule was likewise
unconvincing. His examination lacked consideration of the forum state's
interest in the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in relief and the interstate
interest in efficient resolution of controversies.3" Thus, his validation of
the transient rule was supported solely by his presumption that, based on
history, the rule comports with due process.347 This presumption be-
came his conclusion, tempered only by his summation that Dennis was
voluntarily and knowingly in the state when served.348 Thus, while Jus-
tice Brennan's approach diverged from that of Justice Scalia, his conclu-
sion was nearly identical.
3. Arbitrariness and common sense as measures of due process
Justice White's conclusion was also similar to Justice Scalia's; how-
344. A dispute-blind theory is "based on affiliations between the forum and [an individual]
without regard to the nature of the dispute." Twitchell, supra note 130, at 610.
345. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 413-14, for a- discussion of the
minimum contacts emphasis on litigation-related activities. See Twitchell, supra note 130, at
619-20, for a discussion of dispute-blind and dispute-specific jurisdiction.
The physical power theory is dispute-blind in that it does not consider the relatedness of
the dispute to the defendant's activities in the forum. Id. It provides a basis for general juris-
diction over the individual for any claim. Id. Conversely, the minimum contacts analysis is
almost exclusively dispute specific. Id. at 610.
The International Shoe Court focused on the relationship between the claim and the de-
fendant's forum contacts. The International Shoe decision thereby minimized the role of gen-
eral jurisdiction and focused on the exercise of specific jurisdiction, where the cause of action
arises from the defendant's forum activities. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also
Twitchell, supra note 130, at 624-25 (Court in International Shoe focused on relationship be-
tween claim and defendant corporation's forum contacts).
The dispute at issue has always played a central role in the Court's minimum contacts
analysis. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at
414-16; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775; Rush, 444 U.S. at 329; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213; Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1952).
346. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. Asahi Metal Indus.,
480 U.S. at 113 (to determine reasonableness of jurisdiction court must consider burden on
defendant, interests of forum state, plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, interstate interest in
obtaining efficient resolution of controversies and state's interest in furthering social policies);
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (burden on defendant will be considered in light of
forum's interest in adjudicating dispute, plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, interstate interest
in efficient resolution of controversies and state's interest in furthering social policies). The
interstate interest is particularly crucial in the Burnham case because the petitioner brought
two actions in the New Jersey courts and both were dismissed. Respondent's Brief on the
Merits at app. 1-3.
347. See supra notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
348. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2126 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ever, like Justice Brennan, Justice White disagreed with the traditional
due process analysis Justice Scalia employed.349 Justice Brennan's and
Justice White's conclusions seemed identical-as long as presence in the
forum state is intentional, service within the state's borders is enough to
confer jurisdiction.35 0 Additionally, they both gave tremendous weight
to the tradition behind the physical power theory, but refused to go as far
as Justice Scalia, who explicitly held that tradition was dispositive.35 1
The key distinction in Justice White's approach, however, is his use
of Shaffer.352 Justice White cited Shaffer to point out the Court's au-
thority "to examine even traditionally accepted procedures and declare
them invalid. ' 353 He did not, however, follow the balance of Shaffer's
due process analysis. 354 Instead, Justice White refused to reach the issue
of fairness as applied to a particular non-resident until the rule was
shown to be generally arbitrary and lacking in common sense.355 This
seems to be putting the cart before the horse. How can one ascertain the
arbitrariness of a rule in general without first examining its application in
particular cases?
Additionally, Justice White cited no cases to support this method of
due process analysis.356 In essence, his analysis ignored fairness, or the
lack thereof, in each specific case. Thus, although Justice White's con-
clusion mirrors Justice Brennan's in terms of its scope, his view of Shaf-
fer's due process analysis appeared to be closer to that of Justice Scalia-
that a minimum contacts analysis does not apply to exercises of jurisdic-
tion under the physical power theory.3 57
349. See id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring).
350. See id. at 2119 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2126 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
White used the word "intentional" while Justice Brennan used the phrase "voluntarily and
knowingly." Id. at 2119 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2126 (Brennan, J., concurring).
351. See id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
352. See id. at 2119 (White, J., concurring).
353. Id. (White, J., concurring).
354. Shaffer suggested a due process analysis based on fairness, see Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212,
and defined by International Shoe and its progeny. See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186; Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
355. Id. at 2120 (White, J., concurring).
356. See id at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring). In fact, such precedent is scarce in the area
of jurisdiction. The due process language in Ownbey, 256 U.S. at 111, supports the arbitrary
standard of due process used by Justice White, but Ownbey is of doubtful validity after Shaffer.
See supra note 290 and accompanying text. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) for Justice White's use of this theory in the equal protection area.
357. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring). Justice White acknowl-
edged that Shaffer gives the Court power to declare ancient rules invalid, yet never suggested
why Shaffer's due process analysis does not apply to the physical power rule. Id. (White, J.,
concurring).
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C. State-Court Jurisdiction After Burnham v. Superior Court
The practical impact of the decision in Burnham v. Superior
Court35 is twofold. It provides a solid basis for presence-based jurisdic-
tion cases, but at the same time throws the area of due process analysis
into uncertainty.
1. Physical power
The Court's clear message is that the physical power theory com-
ports with due process-regardless of which due process analysis is ap-
plied.359 This aspect of the Burnham decision reverses the short-lived
trend away from presence-based jurisdiction and toward a single stan-
dard of fairness. 3" More importantly, it provides lower courts with a
seemingly bright-line rule,361 rare in the modem era of personal
jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, this rule has been formulated at 'the expense of the
transient defendant. The Burnham Court did not analyze the fairness of
the physical power rule as applied to the petitioner, Dennis, but instead
performed an abstract analysis of the rule itself.362 As a result, the Burn-
ham decision may preclude any transient individual from challenging the
fairness of the rule's application in his or her particular case.
The only conceivable constitutional flank of the physical power rule
vulnerable to attack after Burnham involves an individual unintention-
ally or involuntarily present in the forum state.363 Prior cases suggest
that such assertions of jurisdiction based upon presence in the forum as a
result of deception or coercion are invalid for policy reasons. 364 In ac-
358. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
359. See id. at 2115-16; id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2126 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
360. Physical presence-based jurisdiction had only been challenged since the decision of
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Cases since Shaffer which invalidated mere presence
as a basis for jurisdiction include: Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42
(3d Cir. 1985); Waffenschmidt v. Mackay, 763 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1056 (1986); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. MI1. 1986);
Energy Reserves Group v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978); Mohler v.
Dorado Wings, Inc., 675 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d
667 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 700 P.2d 347 (1985).
361. Courts citing to this aspect of the Burnham decision have used it as a bright line rule,
affirming exercises of jurisdiction based on service in the state. See, eg., Schall v. Jennings, 99
N.C. App. 343, 346, 393 S.E.2d 130, 132 (1990) (personal service of process within forum
confers jurisdiction).
362. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110-17; id. at 2124-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
363. See id. at 2120 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2126 (Brennan, J., concurring).
364. See Jacobs/Kahan & Co. v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 587, 592 n.7 (7th Cir. 1984) (jurisdiction
may not be premised on physical presence obtained by trickery); Wyman v. Newhouse, 93
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cordance with Justices Brennan's and White's opinions, the Court might
also find such situations offensive to due process. 365
Of course, nothing prevents states from limiting or entirely aban-
doning the in-state-service basis of jurisdiction.36 No state, however,
opted to abolish presence-based jurisdiction when its due process validity
was questionable. Therefore, it is unlikely any will do so now that the
Court has declared transient jurisdiction consistent with due process.
The result is a clear and easily applied rule which dispenses with any
consideration of fairness to the defendant.
2. Due process analysis
The variety of due process theories utilized in Burnham leaves lower
courts no real guidance as to what due process analysis applies to in per-
sonam assertions of jurisdiction.367 Courts may apply Justice Scalia's
"traditional approach," '368 Justice Brennan's "hollowed-out" minimum
contacts approach 369 or Justice White's "valid until arbitrary in a large
number of cases" approach. 370 The problem is that each of these ap-
proaches is novel in the area of personal jurisdiction. The diversity of
these views will cause disagreement among courts as to the practical ap-
plication of Burnham.
Predicting the impact of a splintered opinion such as Burnham is
speculative at best. While it is possible to identify the various approaches
the courts may adopt, identifying which of these they will find to be per-
suasive is impossible.
Justice Scalia's opinion is grounded on the premise that the due
process analysis employed in Shaffer v. Heitner371 does not apply to "all"
assertions of state-court jurisdiction, but only to assertions of jurisdiction
over absent defendants.3 72 Lower courts may use Justice Scalia's reliance
F.2d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1937) (fraud affecting jurisdiction equivalent to lack of jurisdiction),
cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938); Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 F. 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1917) (de-
fendant enticed into forum by false representations of plaintiff not present for jurisdictional
purposes).
365. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2126 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
366. Id. at 2119.
367. See Smith v. Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785, 787-88 n.3 (N.D. 1990). The Smith court
pointed to the lack of guidance in the Burnham decision and concluded "[p]resumably, we will
be further enlightened as to the Supreme Court's position in future decisions." Id.
368. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115-17.
369. See id. at 2124-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
370. See id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring).
371. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
372. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116.
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on tradition to validate not only presence-based assertions of jurisdiction
but other procedures as well.37 The jurisdictional bases of consent and
domicile could likewise be held to per se satisfy due process requirements
by virtue of their pedigree.374 Such a line of decisions would render the
decision in Shaffer an aberration.
Widespread application of Justice Scalia's traditional approach
would require an explanation of how the Shaffer Court could abolish a
rule with such a long tradition. Justice Scalia's answer to that question
was unsatisfactory and may cause confusion for the lower courts.3 "5
Thus, his traditional due process approach will remain flawed until that
question is answered.376
Justice Brennan's approach is grounded upon a premise diametri-
373. Consent and domicile are two bases of jurisdiction which have not been directly sub-
jected to a due process determination since the establishment of the minimum contacts analysis
in International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See, ag., National Equip. Rental
v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
374. For cases validating jurisdiction by consent, see National Equip. Rental, 375 U.S. at
315-16; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). For cases validating jurisdiction based on
domicile, see Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940); Blackmer v. United States, 284
US. 421, 437-38 (1932).
375. Justice Scalia suggested that the Shaffer decision was based on the fact that the Dela-
ware situs of stock rule was used by a minority of states. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116 n.4.
However, the Shaffer decision was actually based on a finding that quasi in rem jurisdiction
was unfair. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
376. Burnham is one of a series of opinions written by Justice Scalia advocating a tradi-
tional approach to Constitutional interpretation. See, eg., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,
110 S. Ct. 2729, 2748-49 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("when a practice not expressly prohib-
ited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, wide-
spread and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no
proper basis for striking it down"); Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115-17 ("a doctrine of personal
jurisdiction that dates back to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally
observed unquestionably meets [due process]"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 127-28
n.6 (1989) (to guide interpretation of due process clause interest denominated as liberty must
be fundamental as well as traditionally protected by society). See generally, E. CHEMERINSKI,
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987) (discussing originalist and non-originalist theories
of constitutional interpretation).
In Michael H., Justice Scalia set forth a traditional due process analysis to determine
which rights rank as "fundamental" and are therefore entitled to higher constitutional protec-
tion. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6. Justice Brennan attacked that analysis as being
indifferent to precedent, and ignorant of the kind of society in which our Constitution exists.
Id. at 137-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Burnham, Justice Brennan again disagreed with
Justice Scalia's use of tradition, finding it foreclosed by precedent. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at
2120 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his non-originalist response, Justice Brennan pointed to
Shaffer as authorizing the Court to invalidate even ancient rules. Id. at 2120-21 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
After Burnham, in Rutan, Justice Scalia again advocated tradition to insulate a practice
from constitutional scrutiny, citing Burnham in the process. Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2749 n.2
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990)). In Rutan,
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cally opposed to that of Justice Scalia. According to Justice Brennan,
Shaffer's due process analysis does apply to "all" assertions of state-court
jurisdiction.377 He does not limit the application of the minimum con-
tacts analysis to assertions of jurisdiction over absent defendants.378 In
the context of his opinion, however, this interpretation of Shaffer is de-
ceivingly simple. In reality, Justice Brennan's opinion is complex and
may be applied by the lower courts in different ways.
Justice Brennan's reliance on Shaffer may be used in a definitional
sense, thereby leading courts to measure all jurisdictional procedures by
an abstract minimum contacts analysis. This would most likely result in
validation of other traditional bases of jurisdiction such as consent and
domicile. Justice Brennan's conclusion in Burnham focused on a know-
ing and voluntary presence.379 Thus, it would be easy to rationalize the
extension to a "knowing and voluntary" consent to jurisdiction.380 Simi-
larly, domicile normally indicates a significant quantum and quality of
contacts, as well as a certain level of voluntariness.81 Therefore, domi-
cile would also fit easily under the type of definitional analysis Justice
Brennan applied.
Justice White's opinion could be interpreted to combine with Justice
Brennan's to create a majority of the Court which would invalidate an
assertion of jurisdiction based on an involuntary or unknowing pres-
ence.382 Both Justice White and Justice Brennan identified voluntariness
without really stating how it would affect their determination if physical
presence were found to be involuntary.383 Thus, courts may attach great
significance to the elements of knowingness and voluntariness when de-
termining the validity of a court's assertion of jurisdiction.
A real problem will arise, however, if lower courts apply Justice
Brennan's minimum contacts analysis on an ad hoc basis to absent de-
fendants. Justice Brennan diverged severely from the minimum contacts
Justice Stevens took issue with Justice Scalia's traditional approach, pointing out that it has
never been supported by a majority of the Court. Id. at 2741 (Stevens, J., concurring).
This ongoing battle indicates the continued existence of an extreme originalist view, based
on tradition, and the vitality of the counter argument against rigid traditional interpretation,
supported by a majority in Burnham. Justice White's and Justice Brennan's concurrences
both refute such an extreme use of tradition. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119-20 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 2120-21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
377. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120-21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
378. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring)
379. Id. at 2126 (Brennan, J., concurring).
380. See supra note 25 for a definition of consent.
381. See supra note 24 for a definition of domicile.
382. See Burnham, 110 S. CL at 2120 (White, J., concurring).
383. Id. (White, J., concurring); id. at 2126 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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analysis applied in earlier cases3 4 by putting tremendous weight on a
defendant's fleeting presence in the state, and ignoring the litigation-re-
latedness aspect of an individual's activities in the state.385 This ap-
proach could potentially subject all travelers to jurisdiction in suits
unrelated to their presence in the forum. The impact of such an ap-
proach would be to destroy the due process clause as an instrument of
interstate federalism.38 6
Lower courts may also interpret Justice Brennan's opinion as not
really applying a minimum contacts analysis at all. His opinion may be
interpreted to support the position that due process simply means fair-
ness. Rather than interpreting minimum contacts as the definition of
what constitutes "fair play and substantial justice," it may be interpreted
as merely one method of determining the fairness of jurisdiction.317 This
approach is based upon the premise that an assertion of jurisdiction must
be fair, regardless of how fairness is determined. The problem with this
interpretation is that it gives lower courts no guidelines on how to deter-
mine fairness; rather, it seems to say that anything goes.
Justice Scalia acknowledged this possible interpretation and there-
fore criticized Justice Brennan's approach as allowing the Justices to re-
place objective legal analysis with their own subjective assessments.388
Such criticism is valid, given the absence of an explanation from Justice
Brennan as to why his approach diverged from the previously applied
minimum contacts analysis. Nothing in Justice Brennan's opinion gives
lower courts any clue as to when or why they should diverge from Inter-
national Shoe and its progeny.38 9
Thus, the Burnham opinions leave the lower courts free to choose
what they glean from this case, even though the only holding truly sup-
ported by a majority is the resurrection of the physical power theory.
The lack of a majority supporting any due process analysis creates the
same uncertainty as did the decision in Shaffer. 9 Lower courts will
have to struggle to determine which due process analysis applies in the
384. The standard analysis looks at the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts with
the forum and the fairness and reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction under the circum-
stances. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980);
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
385. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
386. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (due process clause as instrument of
interstate federalism may sometimes divest state of power to render valid judgment).
387. See Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uni-
form Standards, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1984).
388. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2117.
389. See id. at 2120-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
390. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186. The language in Shaffer declaring that "all assertions of
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area of personal jurisdiction. A coherent due process framework is
needed-one which addresses the evolution of society and its effect upon
jurisdiction jurisprudence.
VI. PROPOSAL: THE PROPER DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Due process is not concerned with the abstract application of a rule,
but the denial of rights to a specific individual.39 Furthermore, tradition
and history do not complete a definition of fair play or substantial justice;
such a definition can only be in terms of a particular problem. 392 One
must first determine what the requirements of due process are in order to
determine whether a rule meets those requirements. In the area of per-
sonal jurisdiction, the proper due process analysis requires: (1) a defini-
tive determination of what type of due process analysis applies to
assertions of personal jurisdiction; and (2) the application of that analysis
to the specific assertion of jurisdiction in this case.
393
A. The Proper Due Process Analysis for Assertions of In Personam
Jurisdiction
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was meant to
change over time, both to include new procedures and exclude those
which are no longer valid. 394 In the area of personal jurisdiction, due
process has evolved in response to changes in society.395 The Court has
acknowledged the need for such evolution in International Shoe Co. v.
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny" left courts guessing as to what "all" really meant. Id. at 212.
391. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945); U.S. CONs'r.
amend. XIV, § 1.
392. Leflar, supra note 287, at 292.
393. This procedure has been used extensively since International Shoe. See, e.g., Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
394. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65-66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
overruled on other grounds in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 101 (1908), overruled on other grounds in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
In Hurtado v. California, the Court, in discussing the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, recognized that due process "does not demand that the laws existing at any point
of time shall be irrepealable, or that any forms of remedies shall necessarily continue." 110
U.S. 516, 536 (1884); cf. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1921) ("procedure customa-
rily employed, long before the Revolution, in the commercial metropolis of England, and gen-
erally adopted by the States as suited to their circumstances and needs, cannot be deemed
inconsistent with due process of law").
395. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Court in
International Shoe acknowledged that the capias ad respondendum had given way to personal
service of summons and reasoned that, as a result, due process requirements had changed as
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Washington ,396 Hanson v. Denckla397 and Shaffer v. Heitner.398 Addi-
tionally, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 399 the Court
pointed out that the limits imposed on state-court jurisdiction by the due
process clause had been substantially relaxed due to fundamentals trans-
formations in the American economy.' The Court also emphasized,
however, that the due process clause remains a limitation on state-court
jurisdiction and would divest the states of power to render a valid judg-
ment if a defendant had no contacts, ties or relations with the forum
state.4o1
Clearly, the evolution of transportation and communication and the
resulting nationalization of commerce has had a profound effect upon
state-court jurisdiction.402 These changes enable individuals to enter and
exit a forum state's territory with greater frequency; they also increase
the chance that an individual may pass through a state's territory with-
out knowing or intending to do so.4 3 Along with these changes came an
increase in the number of individuals causing injury in states where they
were not subject to jurisdiction.' When coupled with the transient ju-
risdiction rule, these. changes necessarily increase an individual's expo-
sure to liability in a forum far from his or her domicile and with which he
or she has had no contacts other than a fortuitous passing."
International Shoe dealt directly with the first risk by permitting the
states to reach non-residents who cause injury in their territory and then
leave.' Shaffer began to deal with the second risk by acknowledging
the unfairness of imposing jurisdiction based on a trivial contact with the
state." 7 Both cases apply the same due process analysis, demonstrating
it to be flexible enough to protect the interests of states and plaintiffs in
well. Id.; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958); supra notes 138-43 and accom-
panying text.
396. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
397. 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
398. 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977).
399. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
400. Id. at 292-93.
401. Id.
402. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186; Hanson, 357
U.S. at 235; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
403. For example, individuals traveling interstate by airplane are not likely to know when
they leave one state and enter another. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark.
1959).
404. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 202.
405. See Grace, 170 F. Supp. at 443.
406. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
407. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
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reaching non-resident defendants while at the same time protecting non-
residents' interests in avoiding burdensome litigation in a distant forum.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in Burnham v. Superior Court,"°8 the
states' newly created power to follow non-residents out of the forum in
order to assert jurisdiction over them was an addition to already existing
bases of jurisdiction.' ° 9 Yet, the minimum contacts analysis was not a
completely novel creation by the International Shoe Court. Rather, it
was an interpretation of the fairness and substantial justice concept the
Court had earlier found to be implicit in due process in Milliken v.
Meyer.4
10
International Shoe and subsequent decisions by the Court further
refined this standard in light of changes in transportation, communica-
tion and commercialization. 411 This progression culminated in Shaffer,
wherein the Court stated that the due process standard set forth by the
minimum contacts analysis applies to all assertions of jurisdiction.412
The analytical difficulty created by this statement was that "all" could be
interpreted as limited to in rem and quasi in rem actions, which the
Court explicitly dealt with in Shaffer, or it could apply to literally "all"
assertions of state-court jurisdiction, as Justice Brennan suggested in
Burnham.413 Much of the language in Shaffer was broad, suggesting
that "all" meant in rem, quasi in rem and in personam actions were to be
treated in the same manner.41 4 The Shaffer Court found that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over property was really the exercise of jurisdiction
over the interests of persons in that property. 1 The Court then held
that the standard for determining the due process validity of an exercise
of jurisdiction over the interests of a person is the minimum contacts
408. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
409. Id. at 2110-15. Other existing bases for jurisdiction included domicile and consent.
See, e-g., National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (parties to contract may
agree in advance to submit to court's jurisdiction); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)
(domicile in forum state was sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction even if defendant was
absent from state when served).
410. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
411. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186; Hanson, 357
U.S. at 235; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
412. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
413. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120-21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
414. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204, 207; id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring) ("the principles of
International Shoe... should be extended to govern assertions of in rem as well as in personam
jurisdiction"); id. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) ("the minimum-contacts
analysis developed in International Shoe ... represents a far more sensible construct for the
exercise of state-court jurisdiction than the patchwork of legal and factual fictions that has
been generated from the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff").
415. Id. at 207.
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standard.41 6 By focusing on the interests of persons, the Court created a
basis for assessing assertions of jurisdiction by a single standard.417
In fact, lower courts41 8 and commentators" 9 have interpreted Shaf-
fer as mandating this result.420 Furthermore, as Justice Brennan pointed
out in Burnham, the minimum contacts analysis is a far more sensible
approach than the "patchwork of legal and factual fictions that has been
generated from ... Pennoyer."'42  Thus, the due process standard by
which the assertion of jurisdiction over Dennis Burnham should be eval-
uated is the minimum contacts analysis formulated by the Court in Inter-
national Shoe and subsequent cases.422
B. The Validity of Jurisdiction Asserted over Dennis Burnham
The due process analysis established by International Shoe Co. v.
Washington 423 and its progeny answers the question of whether a defend-
ant's contacts with the forum are such that it is fair and reasonable to
require him or her to defend against an action brought in that state.424
This analysis requires a fact specific inquiry into the quality and nature of
the defendant's contacts with the forum state.4 2 5 Additionally, the analy-
sis requires courts to balance the interests of the plaintiff, defendant and
forum state and to consider the interstate interests in the efficient resolu-
tion of disputes.426
1. Quality and nature of contacts
In Burnham v. Superior Court,427 the petitioner, Dennis, made at
least one business trip to California each year, except 1984, during the
416. Id.
417. Id. at 209; see Bernstine, supra note 14, at 53-54.
418. See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 47 (3d Cir.
1985); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, 626 F. Supp. 305, 310-13 (N.D. IM. 1986);
Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985).
419. See e.g., Bernstine, supra note 14, at 61; Werner, supra note 14, at 567, 589.
420. Justice Scalia found all cases interpreting Shaffer in this manner to be erroneous.
Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2112-13.
421. Id. at 2121 (Brennan, J., concurring).
422. See supra notes 60-123 and accompanying text.
423. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
424. Id. at 316.
425. See id. at 319.
426. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see supra notes 94-98 and accompa-
nying text.
427. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
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eleven years the Burnhams were married.42 When the Burnhams sepa-
rated in 1987, they reached a marital agreement providing that Dennis
would pay the expenses of relocating his wife and children in Califor-
nia.42 9 Dennis then made two trips to California in 1987 and one in early
1988. During the 1988 trip he was served with the Petition and Sum-
mons in the divorce action brought by his wife.430 After he was served,
Dennis continued regular trips to California to handle personal and busi-
ness affairs and visit his children.4 31 This quantum of contacts is clearly
more substantial than the classic transient defendant had in Grace v.
MacArthur.432
Before his wife and children relocated, Dennis's contacts with Cali-
fornia consisted of business trips unrelated to the divorce litigation.433
He conducted a business seminar in San Diego on one occasion and con-
ceded taking advantage of tax benefits resulting from his business trips to
California.4 34 Thus, Dennis had purposely availed himself of the privi-
lege of conducting business in California and had created continuing ob-
ligations between himself and residents of the forum.4 35 After separating
from his wife, Dennis's visits to the state arguably became litigation-re-
lated when he visited his family.
In Kulko v. Superior Court,436 the Court dealt with a similar situa-
tion. The Kulko plaintiff was the defendant's ex-wife, a California resi-
dent.4 37 She filed suit against her non-resident husband to modify their
custody and child support arrangement.4 38 The parties had been married
during a three-day visit to California.4 3 9 Other than that, however, the
defendant's only contact with California was one twenty-four hour stop-
over many years prior, when he returned from military service.440 The
Court held that the defendant's contacts with California were an insuffi-
428. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 19, Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105
(1990) (No. 89-44).
429. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3, Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105
(1990) (No. 89-44).
430. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petitioner's Brief for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3,
Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (No. 89-44).
431. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 21.
432. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (defendant's only contact was service with process
while flying over forum state).
433. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 19-20.
434. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3.
435. See supra notes 80-93 for a discussion of the purposeful availment requirement.
436. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
437. Id. at 87.
438. Id. at 88.
439. Id. at 86.
440. Id. at 93.
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cient basis for jurisdiction.44 1
Although similar, there are many distinctions between Burnham
and Kulko. First, the divorce had already been adjudicated in Kulko,442
while grounds for the divorce action in Burnham were hotly disputed.' 3
Second, the defendant in Kulko had far fewer contacts with the forum
than Dennis, the petitioner in Burnham . Dennis maintained system-
atic business contacts with California over a twelve-year period.' 5 Thus,
he purposely availed himself of conducting business in the forum.
Finally, the defendant in Kulko was not served in the state, and may
not have known about the action until he was served." 6 Dennis, on the
other hand, knew his wife had filed the petition before he traveled to
California where he was served." 7 When he arrived in Southern Califor-
nia on business, he called his wife, Francie, to talk about the action she
had initiated." 8 Arguably, his trip to California was at least partially
related to his relationship to his wife, which lies at the heart of the dis-
pute in this case. This combination of factors shows more purposeful
availment and litigation-relatedness than Kulko,4 9 thus making Burn-
ham a more compelling basis for jurisdiction.
2. Balancing interests to determine fairness
It is difficult to predict how burdensome the defense of this case in
California would have been for Dennis. He definitely had some contacts
with the state because of his periodic business trips, as well as his visits
with the children.4"0 Thus, he would have visited California periodically,
even without the initiation of this lawsuit. On the other hand, nothing in
the facts suggests that the respondent, Francie, would have visited New
Jersey in a similarly systematic fashion.
Francie and the children established a domicile in California, giving
themselves a substantial connection with the state.451 Accordingly, Cali-
fornia has a definite interest in adjudicating this dispute, in order that its
own domiciliary not be forced to sue in a distant forum.
441. Id. at 101.
442. Id. at 87.
443. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
444. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93-94.
445. See supra notes 427-34 and accompanying text.
446. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 88.
447. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 20.
448. Id. at 5.
449. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93-94.
450. See supra notes 427-34 and accompanying text.
451. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (holding domicile is valid basis of jurisdic-
tion even when domiciliary served while absent from forum).
April 1991]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
Perhaps the most compelling facts arise in the context of the plain-
tiff's interest in having a valid forum and the interstate interest in an
effective resolution of the controversy. Upon separating, the Burnhams
agreed that Francie would file for divorce based on irreconcilable differ-
ences.452 Yet, as soon as Francie moved to California, Dennis filed for
divorce on the ground of desertion. 5 3 Only after unsuccessfully de-
manding that Dennis adhere to their prior agreement did Francie file her
petition for divorce in California.454
If Francie was unable to litigate her claim in California, she may
have been without a remedy. Traveling back to New Jersey to sue her
husband might have been too burdensome for her.455 Dennis filed two
complaints for divorce in New Jersey, and both were dismissed.4 6 The
New Jersey courts refused to allow Dennis to pursue his claim in their
courts because, among other things, they believed he "deliberately and
unfairly manipulated [Francie] into moving to California so he could
bring his divorce action in New Jersey where it would be most conve-
nient for him and inconvenient for [her]." ' 7 The New Jersey courts dis-
missed the actions with knowledge of the suit commenced by Francie in
California, thereby suggesting that they believed California to be the
proper forum.
45 8
The minimum contacts analysis is a flexible test, rather than a set of
rigid rules.4"9 Burnham is exactly the type of case for which this flexibil-
ity was intended. The facts of Burnham indicate that Dennis had some
systematic and continuous business contacts with the forum.4 " Yet they
were not nearly as substantial as those found sufficient for general juris-
diction in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.461 Nevertheless,
when combined with Dennis's litigation-related visits to his wife's house
and the unfairness of allowing Dennis to manipulate a marital agreement
to cause inconvenience to Francie, the exercise of jurisdiction appears to
452. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Arguably, the respondent, Francie, consented to the New Jersey court's jurisdiction by
signing the marital agreement; however, the New Jersey courts dismissed Dennis's actions.
See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at app. 1-3.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. See id.
459. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
460. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 19-21. See supra notes 427-49 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of petitioner's contacts with the forum.
461. 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952) (Phillipine corporation carrying on continuous and system-
atic business in forum held subject to service in forum in action unrelated to its activities
there).
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be quite reasonable and fair.' 2 Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction in this
case meets the requirements of due process as measured by the minimum
contacts analysis.
C. The Validity of the Transient Rule and Other Bases of Jurisdiction
In Burnham v. Superior Court,4 3 the Court lumped all forms of
physical presence together, thus ignoring the reality that different types
of physical presence exist; some of which may be considered a fair basis
for jurisdiction under a minimum contacts analysis and others which
may not be. The minimum contacts analysis acknowledges this by dis-
tinguishing between litigation-related contacts and non-litigation-related
contacts.464 The flexible nature of the minimum contacts analysis was
specifically designed to deal with varying degrees of physical presence.
465
In fact, decisions employing the analysis have created a continuum of
contacts which include varying degrees of presence.466 Accordingly, as a
single standard, the minimum contacts continuum would cover all
situations.
1. Transient jurisdiction
A correct application of the minimum contacts analysis to the tran-
sient rule of jurisdiction would highlight the inherent unfairness of the
rule and mandate its destruction. Changes in society which caused the
evolution of due process, caused the physical power theory to evolve as
well.467 The group of non-residents historically subject to jurisdiction
under the physical power theory now embraces a subset of individuals,
transient defendants, over whom the assertion of jurisdiction might be
462. Justice Scalia would not agree; he believed that if Dennis had been served in New
Jersey, the assertion of jurisdiction would have been unfair. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2117-18.
463. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
464. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
465. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The decision in
International Shoe was a reaction to the change in what could be viewed as a "presence" in
another state due to improvements in transportation and communication. See supra notes
131-43 and accompanying text.
466. See, eg., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (franchisee's few visits
to forum state where franchisor's home office located and franchise contract created, sufficient
for jurisdiction); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (few non-litigation related visits
to state, ex-wife and children in state insufficient basis for jurisdiction); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (no physical presence in state, commercial transactions with
forum resident sufficient for jurisdiction); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952) (no physical presence in forum but systematic, continuous and substantial business con-
tacts with forum sufficient for jurisdiction).
467. See supra notes 45-157 and accompanying text.
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unfair and therefore unconstitutional." The Burnham Court had the
chance to recognize this distinction and distinguish between the general
fairness of the physical power theory and the inherent unfairness of the
transient jurisdiction rule.469 The Court chose not to do this, thereby
ignoring changes in society which have caused corresponding changes in
the due process analysis governing personal jurisdiction.470
A classic example of a transient defendant is found in Grace v. Mac-
Arthur,471 where an individual was served in an airplane within the navi-
gable airspace of the forum state. 72 Justice Brennan would apparently
find an assertion of jurisdiction in such a case valid. After all, Justice
Brennan would say, if the plane crashed, the defendant would have the
benefit of forum state emergency services. 4" Yet, it is precisely this type
of situation which demonstrates the inherent unfairness of the transient
jurisdiction rule and distinguishes it from other assertions of jurisdiction
under the physical power theory.474
Clearly, the one or few contacts a transient defendant has with the
forum will not be weighty factors in a minimum contacts analysis. 475
When such contacts are not at all litigation-related, the minimum con-
tacts analysis requires them to be substantial before jurisdiction will be
valid.47 6 The fewer the contacts, the more closely the Court will look at
litigation-relatedness.4 7 For example, unless the dispute arises out of the
individual's flight over the forum, it is unlikely such a contact alone
would be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
The transient defendant whose only contact with the forum is a
flight within its airspace would likewise fail the purposeful availment ele-
ment of the analysis.4 7 Such a defendant really only avails himself or
468. See supra notes 124-57. Burnham is the first post-International Shoe case wherein the
Court addressed transient jurisdiction, suggesting its recognition of the increasing tension be-
tween the potential unfairness of existing bases of jurisdiction and the minimum contacts
analysis.
469. See Sobeloff, supra note 79, at 208 ("To subject the non-resident individual, or corpo-
ration, to a general in personam jurisdiction because of such limited contact would be unfair
and unreasonable, no matter how adequate the notice.").
470. See supra notes 45-123 and accompanying text.
471. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
472. Id. at 443.
473. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
474. See Sobeloff, supra note 79, at 208; supra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
475. See Kulko, 436 U.S. 84 (marriage and brief visit in state insufficient contacts for juris-
diction); cf. McGee, 355 U.S. 220 (insurance contract with forum resident and receipt of pre-
miums by defendant sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
476. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447.
477. See, eg., McGee, 355 U.S. at 223; Sobeloff, supra note 79, at 208.
478. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (car dealership
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herself of the fundamental right to travel.4 79 Burdening such a funda-
mental right with exposure to liability in distant forums with which the
defendant has, no contact seems unreasonable.480 In most cases this type
of presence will be fortuitous rather than purposeful.481
A forum state does have an interest in providing its residents relief;
however, it has little interest in adjudicating a dispute with which it has
no connection.482 Furthermore, the burden of being forced to litigate in
a distant forum with which an individual has no contacts would likely
outweigh this type of generic forum interest.4 83 Additionally, contrary to
what Justice Brennan suggests,48 4 the doctrine of forum non conveniens
does not provide a reliable remedy for the unfairness in this situation,
because it is largely discretionary.
Thus, a true minimum contacts analysis demonstrates that transient
jurisdiction, in its pure form, fails to meet the requirements of due pro-
cess.485 The analysis also shows that rules with rigid definitions such as
physical power and transient jurisdiction have no place in a system of
jurisdiction measured by a minimum contacts standard. There is simply
no need for definitional rules with a fact specific standard such as mini-
mum contacts. All such rules will fit somewhere along the continuum of
due process fairness.
2. Consent
There may be only one contact in a case of consent-based jurisdic-
tion; a factor which would seem to weigh against the assertion ofjurisdic-
tion. Yet, consent is the ultimate form of purposeful availment. By
contractually consenting or appointing an agent for service in the forum,
which sold car that caused accident in forum state held not subject to jurisdiction in forum);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (owners of stock in company incorporated in forum
state held not to meet purposeful availment requirement); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958) (purposeful availment of bank not satisfied by unilateral act of trustee who moved to
another state after establishing trust with bank); cf. Burger King, 471 U.S. 462 (franchisee's
few business visits to forum and relationship with forum state franchisor sufficient for jurisdic-
tion); McGee, 355 U.S. 220 (life insurance company's periodic receipt of payments from forum
resident sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
479. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); supra notes 147-50 and accom-
panying text.
480. See Bernstine, supra note 14, at 65; Comment, supra note 124, at 197-98.
481. See Werner, supra note 14, at 611.
482. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 100-01.
483. See id.
484. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125 (Brennan, J., concurring).
485. See Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 47 (3d Cir. 1985);
Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, 626 F. Supp. 305, 310-13 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Ber-
shaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985).
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an individual purposefully invokes the benefits of that forum's legal sys-
tem.486 In essence, by consenting to a state's jurisdiction an individual
chooses his or her own forum. Absent a showing that such consent was
involuntarily or unknowingly made, consent is likely to meet the mini-
mum contacts standard of due process.48 7
3. Domicile
Domicile likewise presents a strong case for validation under the
minimum contacts analysis. A domiciliary generally has substantial con-
tacts with the state where he or she has established a permanent resi-
dence.4"' Additionally, domiciliaries purposefully avail themselves of
privileges and protections of the state. 89 In the majority of cases, requir-
ing a domiciliary to defend against a suit brought in his or her home state
will be found reasonable. The only situation in which it could be ques-
tioned under a minimum contacts analysis is if the domiciliary has left
the forum permanently, but has yet to establish a new domicile.4 90 If the
litigation arose out of the domiciliary's prior contacts in the forum, juris-
diction would likely be valid. In the case where the litigation arose else-
where, however, the burden on the domiciliary might result in a finding
that jurisdiction was invalid.
This could cause a dilemma where denial of jurisdiction would de-
prive a plaintiff of any possible relief. The potential for such a result
would impact the fairness analysis, as the plaintiff's interest in relief
would become a weighty factor due to the necessity of the plaintiff having
at least one forum in which to seek relief. In the case of an absent domi-
ciliary whom the plaintiff is having difficulty tracking, the necessity ele-
ment would favor requiring the domiciliary to return to the forum. Such
a necessity element could arise in potentially any situation and would
change the minimum contacts analysis accordingly. This exemplifies the
flexibility which gives the minimum contacts analysis the ability to deal
with even the hardest cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in Burnham v. Superior Court 4 9 will do more to hin-
486. See National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964).
487. See id. at 317-18.
488. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940).
489. See id.
490. See id. at 463 (domicile held to suffice as basis for jurisdiction so long as service is
reasonably calculated to give actual notice of proceedings).
491. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
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der than help lower courts in their interpretation of Shaffer v. Heitner.4 9 2
Rather than answer the post-Shaffer question of which due process anal-
ysis applies to assertions of in personam jurisdiction, the Court focused
on resurrecting the physical power rule. The result was an incoherent
variety of due process theories, none of which was supported by a major-
ity of the Court.493 The by-product of these analyses was the resurrec-
tion of the antiquated theory of physical power without considering the
inherent unfairness of its modern day counterpart-the transient rule of
jurisdiction. This decision will lead to an increase in unfair assertions of
jurisdiction. Ultimately, it will require the Court to reexamine and spec-
ify when the courts should apply the "fairness and substantial justice
standard" elucidated in the minimum contacts line of cases.494
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